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 Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s many state and federal courts rendered 
judicial decisions that enhanced status protections for an array of racial 
minorities, women, putative fathers, and single adults.1  For the most part, these 
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 1. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts 
statute allowing married people to get contraceptives but prohibiting single people to get 
contraceptives was unconstitutional, in violation of the equal protection clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 657–59 (1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause required the state to provide all 
parents with a hearing on their parental fitness before removing children from their custody); Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–59 (1964) (finding that Congress had 
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protections were based on revitalized notions of individual liberty, equal 
protection, or newly discovered privacy rights.  The engines for change were 
discovered in constitutional guarantees, sometimes state but most often federal, 
such as guarantees under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, 
or a combination of both.  A smattering of judicial decisions involved the 
discovered constitutional guarantee of privacy, based on a penumbra involving 
five separate and specific constitutional rights.2  And in a few instances, state 
courts utilized equitable remedies such as estoppel or quantum meruit to 
overturn long-standing public policies that had grown moribund with the 
evolution of a more pluralistic, mobile, and increasingly technological society.  
Courts during this period of time often admitted that their decisions were guided 
by public reality, not public policy.  The reality about which courts wrote was 
the existence of many cohabiting nonmarital adults, prompting courts to provide 
protection for vulnerable adults and children so as to safeguard the reasonable 
expectations of one or both parties upon the cessation of the cohabitation. 
Overall, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed the growth of 
private ordering among competent and consenting adults.  This development 
marked a departure from traditional “form family” structures premised upon 
marriage, statutory adoption, or consanguinity.  Form families had been the 
bedrock beneath society, the structure that provided access to income, 
inheritance, and inclusivity in the past.  Nonetheless, increasingly, adult same 
and opposite-sex partners were cohabiting, working toward common economic 
goals, and many were having children through intercourse or through scientific 
breakthroughs available through assisted reproductive technology.  All of these 
cohabiting adult partners were aware of the advantages associated with form 
status arrangements, but they chose instead to create what would be termed 
“functional families,” relying upon their individuality and ingenuity instead of 
societal apparatus.3 
The expansion of functional families complemented newly-invented media 
offerings such as music, television, and cinema.  Media contributed to 
community building, complementing adult individual decision making.  Pop 
culture opened horizons to what was possible and supported choices within an 
intangible community.  Increasingly, the parameters of an adult were freed from 
parochial confines and exposed to a broader taste of an undiscovered society that 
offered more freedom of individual choice.  In addition, decision freedom was 
enabled by enhanced employment opportunities, such as individual access to 
                                                          
the authority to prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations under the Commerce 
Clause). 
 2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1972) (“[T]he Court has recognized that a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (establishing the existence 
of constitutional “zones of privacy” evinced by the “specific guarantees in the bill of rights”). 
 3. See J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Winding Road from Form to Function: A 
Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 2, 25–28 (2008). 
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birth control, scientific assisted reproductive technology, acceptability of third-
party child care, and enhanced medical care. Freed of societal restraints, adults 
in American society asked themselves, “Why not?” and embarked on quests to 
find fulfillment in relationships that functioned well for themselves. 
Courts and a few legislatures struggled to establish restitutive structures when 
functional relationships became dysfunctional, resulting in financial disparity 
between the former partners. Stripped of the familiar status entitlements of 
statutory or common law marriage, courts struggled to establish equitable 
enforcement of individualized oral arrangements through slippery toeholds such 
as equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, or quantum meruit.  Precarious at 
best, functional families most often resulted from oral agreements between the 
parties.  Yet to be enforceable in law, these agreements had to reach the level of 
clear and convincing evidence.4  Only the most prudent and prescient of couples 
could meet this evidentiary test.  Courts, and perhaps individuals involved, 
viewed financial loss as commensurate with the vagaries of functional families, 
any economic risk voluntarily assumed by an adult partner at the start or during 
the relationship.  But this was not always the case, and the burden was especially 
difficult for same-sex functional families.  Their employers, localities, and state 
of residence increasingly struggled with the disparate treatment afforded to 
same-sex couples in terms of public perception, medical insurance, bereavement 
exemptions, and housing accommodations. 
Same-sex adults entered into functional families as did their opposite-sex 
neighbors.  However, it was not exactly the same because same-sex couples were 
legally prohibited from entering into the legal status of marriage.5  Plus, they 
were often subjected to discriminatory practices and even criminal 
prosecutions.6  Initially, and especially in the early 1980s, commensurate with 
the AIDS epidemic, same-sex couples were concerned about health care 
insurance for partners, plus any other business benefits afforded married 
couples.  The concurrent tide of judicial decisions involving equal protection 
and due process guarantees precipitated an evolving public awareness of the 
inequality of treatment of same-sex couples. Awareness prompted sporadic 
legislative enactment of newly invented domestic partnerships, evolving into 
                                                          
 4. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Chamberlin, 118 A.3d 229, 233–34, 242 (Me. 2015) 
(reversing and remanding a probate court’s holding that a grandmother who had lived with her 
grandchild and the child’s mother for several years before the mother had died was the de facto 
guardian because the probate court did not apply a standard of clear and convincing evidence). 
 5. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (“Only a union between one man and one woman 
may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (1996) 
(“Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“The question before the Court 
is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate sexual conduct.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1986) (“In August 
1982, respondent Hardwick . . . was charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing 
sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of [Hardwick’s] home.”). 
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reciprocal beneficiaries and finally, prior to same-sex marriage, civil unions.7  
Incrementally, a patchwork of nontransferable state economic benefits pertinent 
only to same-sex couples arose across the country.8  Some cities and states 
provided protection and benefits to same-sex couples, while others did not.  
Interstate Full Faith and Credit was inapplicable, but the process had begun, a 
process that would eventually lead to providing economic protections and 
benefits similar to marriage.  Very few anticipated where equality would 
develop, but there was no turning back. 
Efforts by states to provide a modicum of financial protection and associated 
benefits to adult functional families were restrained, in part, because of the core 
premise of functional families: individual freedom.  Functionality lacked 
objective parameters historically associated with marriage.  Although courts and 
legislatures may have been restrained regarding financial protection afforded to 
functional family adults, they showed no restraint when seeking to protect the 
children of these functional adults.  Many of these families were, and are, having 
children. Today’s statistics are a product of the decades that have passed: More 
than forty percent of children born in America today are born to unmarried 
parents and only half of all cohabiting adults in America are currently married.9  
While many children are born to single parents, others are part of the two-person 
unmarried cohabiting functional family paradigm.  What is the status of these 
children?  Parental status is more easily established when a couple is married 
and a court may rely upon a status-conferring device such as the Uniform 
Parentage Act (UPA).  But without marriage, courts struggle to establish 
parenthood, child support, state and federal benefits, custody and visitation, and 
adoption. 
Supreme Court decisions occurring during the period of the ascendancy of 
functional families sought to protect nonmarital children from discrimination 
and to protect the paternal rights of men seeking to establish parenthood.10  How 
should paternity be established? Traditionally, paternity was established through 
state paternity statutes, based in whole or part on the UPA, which offered 
                                                          
 7. See generally Courtney Thomas-Dusing, Note, The Marriage Alternative: Civil Unions, 
Domestic Partnerships, or Designated Beneficiary Agreements, 17 J. GENDER RACE AND JUST. 
163, 174 (2014) (stating that states enacted a variety of legal protections for same-sex couples, 
including domestic partnerships, civil unions, and beneficiary registries). 
 8. See generally Civil Union and Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domestic-
partnership-statutes.aspx (last updated Nov. 18, 2014). 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2014 2 (Dec. 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/ 
nvsr64/nvsr64_12.pdf. 
 10. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 351 (2011) (“Nonmarital children’s legal status has 
improved significantly in the last forty years as a result of numerous Supreme Court decisions 
striking down discriminatory laws on equal protection grounds.”). 
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presumptions of paternity.11  But these presumptions were in almost all instances 
premised upon a valid marriage, a status inconsistent with functional families.  
Only gradually did the presumption of paternity include the basis of a man 
receiving a child into his home and openly holding the child as his own natural 
child.  For same-sex couples, marriage was unavailable until 2015, and bringing 
a child into a same-sex home had to address the rights of the biological parents 
who conceived the child.12  Some relief was provided through state legislation 
enacted to provide a status similar to marriage, such as a civil union or reciprocal 
beneficiaries.13  But these status arrangements varied according to the laws of 
each state, and there was neither reciprocity nor Full Faith and Credit to 
guarantee enforcement among all the states.   In spite of the legal obstacles, 
same-sex couples were having children, some through adoption and, 
increasingly, some through advances in assisted reproductive technology and 
surrogacy contracts. 
Assisted by a series of Supreme Court decisions, states developed a 
heightened awareness of parenthood.  By the beginning of the twentieth century, 
statutes were introduced to make uniform rules pertaining to the establishment 
of paternity.  But these nascent efforts were futile.  Eventually, in 1973, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed a 
uniform law that was titled the Uniform Parentage Act.  This landmark 
legislation assembled approaches to paternity in use by the various states.  A 
significant feature of the 1973 Act is its creation of a presumptive basis of 
parentage.14  For example, a person is presumed to be a parent because of a name 
on a birth certificate or continuous cohabitation with the biological parent of the 
child.15  The presumption of paternity was most easily established through 
marriage of a man and a woman and the woman gives birth to a child.  The child 
could have no genetic connection with the husband, but the presumption of 
paternity resulted from the marriage of the mother and her husband. 
The UPA created an understandable means of establishing parentage.  From 
this status flowed protection for a putative father, but it also provided for the best 
interest of any child by easily creating obligations of support, inheritance, and 
                                                          
 11. Parentage Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act 
Summary.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). 
 12. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding that same-sex 
couples may not be deprived of the fundamental right to marry); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. 
Rptr. 212, 216 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he courts and our Legislature have chosen to place paramount 
importance on the relationship between the natural . . . parent and the child.”); see, e.g., Alison D. 
v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991), overruled by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 
N.Y.3d 1 (2016) (holding that petitioner had no right to visitation of the child she helped raise with 
her same-sex partner because it would “limit or diminish the right of the . . .  biological parent”). 
 13. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1202–1204 (2016) (recognizing the right of same-sex 
couples to enter into a civil union and providing them with the same benefits and protections given 
to heterosexual couples in a civil marriage). 
 14. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 15. Id. 
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family permanence.  Gradually, science advanced and the necessity of 
establishing parentage through facile presumptions such as marriage became 
less preferable.  Genetic testing provided certainty of parentage whereby 
presumptions established under the UPA provided only that, presumptions.  
Estoppel, so as to protect the child’s established identity with a parent, then 
developed.  Standing to use genetic test results and the best interest of the child 
became standards by which presumptions were maintained in spite of the reality 
of genetic testing. 
Science continued to broaden the means by which a person could become a 
parent through assisted reproductive technology.  Current technological 
advances permit persons and couples to cryopreserve sperm, eggs, and embryos 
for future use; continuing advances promise a future when a child could have 
multiple persons with parental genetic connections.  The National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws struggled to address scientific 
advances, proposing revisions to the UPA in 2000 and then again in 2002.  One 
of these revisions allows “consent” to bring about parentage.16  That is, 
whenever a man gives consent to assisted reproduction by a woman that results 
in the birth of a child, that child is presumed to be the child of the man.  Other 
than residing in the same household as a child and holding the child out as his 
own for the first two years of the child’s life, marriage is required to bring about 
parentage of a child.  Sadly, none of these means of establishing paternity 
conveniently accommodated the functional lives of same-sex couples. 
Same-sex couples commonly participate in assisted reproduction or adoption 
to have a child.  Male couples often entered into surrogacy contracts in states 
that permitted them, the sperm of one of the men being used for conception.  
Among female couples, one of the parties is artificially inseminated with donor 
sperm.  But in both cases the same-sex couple intends to raise the child together 
as joint parents.  Nonetheless, often the relationship ends and the party with a 
genetic link to the child prohibits the nonbiological party from visitation, 
prompting a suit for custody or visitation.  Often, because the nonbiological 
party lacks a statutorily defined parent connection with the child, parental status 
can be denied and the child loses the opportunity to receive financial support or 
parental companionship from this genetic-stranger-party.  Concomitantly, the 
genetically absent former partner loses the companionship and child-rearing 
opportunities provided by the child.  These cases abound.  Most often the 
nongenetic party accompanied a partner through the assisted reproductive 
procedure, the birth of the child, and the adults made an oral agreement to raise 
a child together, and served for a period of time in a parental role for the resulting 
child, both economically and socially. 
Courts increasingly addressed this factual anomaly and some began to fashion 
equitable remedies since state parentage statutes offered no remedies.  Critics 
argued that establishing parentage was better left to the legislature, not the 
                                                          
 16. Id. § 201(b)(5) (amended 2002). 
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courts, and many commentators bemoaned the nebulous grounds for these 
equitable remedies, as well as the costly and lengthy process their application 
required.17  Courts applying equity looked to oral and written agreements 
between the parties, estoppel due to the passage of time, and the best interests of 
the children involved.  Among the equitable remedies utilized or considered by 
courts were doctrines such as extraordinary circumstances, the child’s 
detrimental reliance, equitable estoppel, de facto parenthood, or the more 
subjective term psychological parent.18  Some of these equitable remedies were 
even codified by a few state legislatures, providing a more objective standard in 
that particular state.19  But while many states embraced these devices for what 
they were—equitable remedies meant to complement statutory parenthood 
established through marriage—other states rejected them outright as judicial 
fabrications, intrusions into the prerogative of the state legislature to create the 
status of parent.  Critics argued that paternity is established by statute, and it is 
the prerogative of the legislature to draft and enact statutes. 
Paternity status matters to adults raising a child together.  The materiality of 
parentage was heightened in 2000 with the Troxel v. Granville20 decision.  In 
this landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court firmly established the 
fundamental right of a parent to raise his or her child, specifically in reference 
to restricting or withholding visitation sought by any nonparent.21  Only clear 
and convincing evidence may rebut a parent’s fundamental authority to do what 
the parent concludes is in the best interest of the child.22  Then, in 2015, the 
Court made it decidedly easier for same-sex couples to achieve parental status.  
In the Obergefell v. Hodges23 decision, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires states to license marriages between two people of the same 
sex and, in addition, to recognize any marriage between two people of the same 
sex when that marriage was fully licensed and performed in another state.24  The 
Court’s decision brought to fruition intermediary economic status protections 
codified as domestic partnerships, reciprocal beneficiaries, and civil unions.  
These nonmarital status arrangements provided same-sex couples a patchwork 
of financial protection dotted across the nation.25  Now they were no longer 
                                                          
 17. See Jennifer Sroka, Note, A Mother Yesterday, But Not Today: Deficiencies of the 
Uniform Parentage Act for Non-biological Parents in Same-Sex Relationships, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 
537, 544–47 (2013) (illustrating the difficulty of determining parentage rights in same-sex couples 
through the use of equitable remedies). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 539. 
 19. Id. at 556. 
 20. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 21. Id. at 72. 
 22. Id. at 70 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999)). 
 23. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 24. Id. at 2607. 
 25. See Same-Sex Couples, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/people/same-sexcouples/ 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2016) (explaining the Social Security Administration recognizes civil unions 
and domestic partnerships for purposes of deciding claims to Social Security benefits, Medicare, 
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needed to protect the economic interests of same-sex functional families.  
Nonetheless, Obergefell did more than provide financial security for couples.  It 
provides an objective standard by which same-sex couples can marry and enjoy 
the objective statutory formulations of state parentage acts.  This raises the 
question of whether Obergefell makes obsolete the equitable remedies adopted 
to protect the parental interests of nonbiological persons raising children. 
This Article raises an issue that will be resolved in the decades to come.  The 
issue is whether the nation-wide availability of same-sex marriage resulting from 
Obergefell, and the presumption of parenthood status that comes with marriage, 
will challenge the necessity of equitable remedies previously used to determine 
parenthood status before marriage was available.  Just as marriage made 
domestic partnerships, reciprocal beneficiaries, and civil unions unnecessary, is 
it time to discard those equitable remedies—de facto parenthood, psychological 
parents, and coparenting agreements—as relics of a past age?  For multiple 
reasons these equitable remedies have been employed by courts and legislatures 
to establish parenthood since the 1960s and 1970s; but has the time come to put 
aside these equity devices and rely instead on the opportunity now extended to 
all to participate in the status of marriage?  Has the Obergefell decision 
inaugurated a change in perspective, one that no longer needs equitable remedies 
to provide protective status to unmarried adults since marriage equality provides 
equality for all? 
To address Obergefell’s impact on functional parents, it is necessary to 
address the rationale underlying functional families, the history, and the current 
status.  There are two aspects to this family paradigm: the protection of economic 
interests and the protection of children.  Then this Article will address the 
litigious evolution of parental status, discussing cases that crafted the equitable 
remedies used to enforce oral parenting plans that were discarded upon the 
cessation of the adult functional relationship.  Likewise, this Article will discuss 
statutory proposals meant to provide objective parental status—efforts 
promulgated by the American Law Institute (ALI) or individual states enacting 
similar de facto parenthood qualifications.  Finally, this Article will analyze 
Obergefell’s impact on these parental status accommodations. 
                                                          
and eligibility and payment amount for Supplemental Security Income); see also Carlsmith Ball, 
LLP, Hawaii State Legislature Passes Bills That May Create Administrative Burdens, 1 NO. 12 
PAC. EMP. L. LETTER 5 (1997); GLAD, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP BENEFITS: OVERVIEW (2014), 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/domestic-partnership-overview.pdf.  Many states 
have domestic partnership laws, extending traditional marital benefits to same-sex couples, while 
Hawaii and Vermont have enacted laws extending certain benefits to same-sex couples as 
“reciprocal beneficiaries.”  See Saskia Kim & Drew Liebert, A Primer on Civil Unions, ASSEMBLY 
JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. STATE LEGISLATURE (2001), http://ajud.assembly.ca.gov/sites/ajud. 
assembly.ca.gov/files/reports/1001%20backgroundpaper.pdf  (showing that in California, a partner 
in a civil union shall have all the same rights, protections, benefits, and responsibilities as those 
granted to a spouse in a civil marriage). 
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I.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FUNCTIONAL FAMILY 
A.  Nonmarital Adult Couples 
1.  Marvin v. Marvin and Its Progeny 
Statistics reveal that in the United States during the last forty years the number 
of married couples with their own children decreased from 40.3% to 20.9% of 
all families and that there was a 41% increase in unmarried partner 
households.26  The increasing number of nonmarital adult households has 
continued in the United States for decades, corresponding with trends 
throughout the world.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in 2000, noted the diversity in 
American families, commenting in a landmark decision involving the 
fundamental rights of parents that “[t]he demographic changes of the past 
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.  The 
composition of families varies greatly from household to household.”27  
 Earlier, in 1976, the California Supreme Court took note of the numerical 
increase in the diversity and the number of unmarried households and issued an 
opinion that would revolutionize the approach taken towards nonmarital, 
intimate couples in general, and specifically, the economic consequences of the 
dissolution of these couples.  In Marvin,28 the highest court of California ruled 
that “[t]he courts should enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners 
except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration 
of meretricious sexual services.”29  And in the absence of an express contract 
between the unmarried partners, courts should “inquire into the conduct of the 
parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, 
agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding 
between the parties.”30  And in the absence of an implied contract, the court 
sanctioned the use of alternative remedies, such as “the doctrine of quantum 
meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts . . . .”31 
                                                          
 26. JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: 2012 5 (2013); DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS 
AND FAMILIES: 2010 3 (2012); see also Unmarried and Single Americans Week Sept. 20–26, 2015, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2015/cb15-ff19.html 
(Sept. 15, 2015) (reporting that there were seven million unmarried partner households in 2013 and 
that of this number 573,530 were same-sex households). 
 27. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees a parent a fundamental right to raise his or her child). 
 28. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).  For commentary, see, for example,  
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159 
(2013). 
 29. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  The court reiterated its support for equitable remedies later in the opinion.  Id. at 123 
n.25–26. 
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The court in Marvin began its opinion with an acknowledgement that 
“[d]uring the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the number 
of couples living together without marrying.”32  The court further observed the 
economic consequences of these partnerships when one of the parties dies or the 
partnership otherwise dissolves.  How should property acquired during the 
partnership be divided and concomitantly, should there be an order of financial 
support?  The facts in Marvin are common to many similar disputes, opposite-
sex and same-sex.  Plaintiff alleged that she lived with defendant, Lee Marvin, 
from October 1964 through May 1970 and fulfilled her responsibilities resulting 
from a promise by the defendant to take care of her, which she alleged he made 
prior to their cohabitation.33  She further alleged that the defendant orally 
promised that while they lived together they would combine their efforts and 
earnings and share any property accumulated.34  Defendant was an actor and 
plaintiff surrendered her career as an entertainer and singer to devote her time to 
defendant as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook.35 In return, 
defendant agreed “to provide for all of plaintiff’s financial support and needs for 
the rest of her life.”36 
During their nearly seven years together “the parties as a result of their efforts 
and earnings acquired in defendant’s name substantial real and personal 
property, including motion picture rights worth over $1 million.”37  The 
relationship ended when defendant, Lee Marvin, compelled plaintiff to leave the 
household, subsequently providing support for her for a little more than a year 
but then refused to contribute anything further.  Plaintiff filed suit against 
defendant to determine her contract and property rights and to impose a 
constructive trust upon one-half of the property acquired during the nonmarital 
relationship.38  After a trial on these issues, the trial court ruled in favor of the 
defendant and plaintiff appealed.39  The hurdle that plaintiff faced at trial was 
the defendant’s reliance upon the “supposed ‘immoral’ character” of the 
relationship and that any “enforcement of the contract would violate public 
policy.”40  But the appellate court failed to find any pattern in past California 
decisions that would bar enforcement of nonmarital agreements not expressly 
founded upon illicit sexual services.41  Instead, in a seminal decision, the 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 109 (relying upon 1970 census figures indicating that at the time there were perhaps 
eight times as many couples living together without being married as cohabited ten years before). 
 33. Id. at 110. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 110–11. 
 39. Id. at 111. 
 40. Id. at 112. 
 41. Id. at 113.  The court stated: “The principle that a contract between nonmarital partners 
will be enforced unless expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual 
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appellate court ruled that “adults who voluntarily live together and engage in 
sexual relations are . . . as competent as any other persons to contract respecting 
their earnings and property rights.”42  Furthermore, to deny relief when there is 
an agreement between the parties permits one party to “retain a disproportionate 
amount of the property.”43 
The Marvin court did not attempt to fit the nonmarital relationship into any 
pre-established form relationship, such as common law marriage or putative 
spouses.  The court observed, “[w]e need not treat nonmarital partners as 
putatively married persons in order to apply principles of implied contract, or to 
extend equitable remedies; we need to treat them only as we do any other 
unmarried persons.”44  Instead, the court expressly recognized that “many young 
couples live together without the solemnization of marriage.”45  And 
furthermore, the court found “[t]hat the mores of the society have indeed 
changed so radically in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard 
based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so widely 
abandoned by so many.”46  The court then reversed the trial court and remanded 
it so as to permit the plaintiff to proceed with her claim.47  The rationale of the 
court, providing equitable remedies when statutory relief was unavailable, was 
done in the context of protecting economic interests.  The protection of the 
parental interests of functional families through equitable means was in its 
nascent stages at that time.  Today, the parameters of private ordering among 
adults forming functional families, both economically and as parents, may be 
summarized by one commentator: 
People should be their own lawmakers when it comes to their personal 
relationships.  Because family and intimate relationships are highly 
unique and individual, they often do not fit within the limitations of 
government regulations, and may be more functionally structured 
through contracts.  Families that do not fit the traditional mold should 
not have to wait for government approval to attain status equivalent to 
                                                          
services not only represents the distillation of the decisional law, but also offers a far more precise 
and workable standard than that advocated by defendant.”  Id. at 114. 
 42. Id. at 116. 
 43. Id. at 121. 
 44. Id.  Common-law marriage is and was unavailable in California and the court defined and 
rejected the application of the putative spouse doctrine.  See id. at 118. 
 45. Id. at 122. 
 46. Id.  For commentary on the changes, see Raymond C. O’Brien, Family Law’s Challenge 
to Religious Liberty, 45 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 3, 34–54 (2012) [hereinafter Family Law’s 
Challenge to Religious Liberty]. 
 47. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 123.  Upon remand the Los Angeles Superior Court ordered the 
defendant to pay the plaintiff $104,000 to assist with her economic rehabilitation.  See Marvin v. 
Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rptr. 3077, 3085 (Apr. 24, 1977).  Nonetheless, a California appellate court 
deleted the rehabilitative award, holding that the facts did not reveal any basis, in either law or 
equity, for the economic award to the plaintiff.  See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 
(1981).  But the rationale of the appellate decision remains. 
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their married counterparts, or, in the case of intended parents who are 
not biologically related to their intended children, their biological 
counterparts.  Instead, such partners and intended parents should be 
able to secure their rights through private contract.  Contracts can 
better protect the legal interests of non-married couples and non-legal 
parents in many cases because contracts affirm autonomy rather than 
reinforce government as the arbiter of what “family” means.48 
2.  Adult Status Arrangements 
The individual freedoms of adults developed over time.  It was in 1964 that 
the plaintiff and defendant, illustrated in Marvin, met and initiated their 
nonmarital cohabitation.  The following year, in 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Griswold v. Connecticut,49 holding that the U.S. Constitution 
guaranteed married couples the right to privacy, a right inferred from the 
penumbra found within five constitutional guarantees.50  Then, in 1972,  after 
the Marvin couple separated in 1971, the Court would decide Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,51 holding that the right to privacy was extended to individuals, not just 
married couples.52  The Eisenstadt decision safeguarded individuals from 
unwarranted governmental intrusions into his or her sexual conduct.53  But the 
decision also strengthened individuality, the core element of functional families.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, courts would address the constitutional rights 
of functional families when zoning ordinances sought to restrict residential 
occupancy—excluding persons unrelated by blood, marriage, or adoption.54  
Courts were challenged to address form family restrictions on many issues.  
Perhaps prompted by the impact of the AIDS crisis in New York City and the 
need for housing support, one New York decision extended rent control support 
from form family restrictions to include functional families.55  Fueled by success 
                                                          
 48. Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family 
Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1031–32 (2015). 
 49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 50. Id. at 485–86. 
 51. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 52. Id. at 453–54. 
 53. Id.  For a discussion of the transition from Griswold to Eisenstadt, see, for example, Janet 
L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 
1521–22 (1994); John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING 
IMAGES OF THE FAMILY (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979). 
 54. See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding that a local zoning 
ordinance could exclude functional families, that is, persons not related by blood, marriage or 
adoption, to safeguard economic interests in the community); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (holding a local ordinance that divides a family violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it intrudes on family living arrangements by forcing 
adults and children to live in certain narrowly confined patterns). 
 55. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54–55 (N.Y. 1989) (holding 
that the concept of family should be based on an objective assessment of the relationship between 
the adult parties and not on form factors). 
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in the pursuit of constitutional protections, individuals comprising functional 
families continued to petition for greater access to economic benefits heretofore 
reserved for form families. 
Constitutional litigation was often based on the heretofore mentioned right to 
privacy, but also Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech and 
Association,56 all of which would find expression in Obergefell much later.  
Concomitantly, society was becoming more mobile, more attuned to media 
assimilation, and more inclusive in attitudes.57  As a result, the population was 
more aware of arguments in favor of abortion rights, nonmarital cohabitation, 
no-fault divorce, and the acceptability of nonmarital children.  Movies and 
television shows depicted persons living lifestyles based on functional family 
norms, and greater equality of employment and birth control accessibility fueled 
multiple lifestyle options.  Increasingly, optional lifestyle choices were not 
limited to opposite sex adults.  Same-sex couples formed functional families too, 
clandestinely at first, but as with other couples they gained increasing protection 
from media and a modicum of constitutional protection.58 
Many same-sex couples developed an appreciation of the benefits associated 
with marriage because they were denied them.  While they were able to enter 
into functional families, they were barred from the status of marriage, which 
offered many attractive economic and social benefits.59  Gradually, prompted in 
part by functional family litigation success, same-sex couples lobbied employers 
for marriage-like benefits for their partners.  These would include health 
insurance, company employee benefits, bereavement leave, paid leave for the 
birth of a child, and the ability to make medical determinations for a partner.  
These employer benefits would evolve to be called domestic partnerships.60  
Entry into and out of the partnership involved registration with an employer 
willing to provide the status, nothing similar to the extensive requirements 
necessary to enter into a valid marriage.  Although restricted to same-sex 
                                                          
 56. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984) (Freedom of Association); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1978) (Due Process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
12 (1967) (Equal Protection and Due Process). 
 57. See, e.g., O’Brien, Family Law’s Challenge to Religious Liberty, supra note 46, at 84–88 
(describing the challenge of an evolving world view for a world view based on religious guidelines). 
 58. One 5–4 Supreme Court decision created an impediment to same-sex couples.  See 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a state statute criminalizing consensual 
sodomy between persons of the same sex).  Eventually the decision was challenged in Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996), and overturned in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 
(2003).  “By 2010 the number of same-sex partner households rose by 51.8% and to 0.8% of all 
households; they rose slightly to 11.6% of unmarried-partner households.”  Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, With Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation on the Rise, What About Marital Rights 
for Unmarried Partners?, 41 ACTEC L.J. 49, 55 (2015). 
 59. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (denying same-sex 
couple’s challenge to statute restricting marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples based on the 
definition of marriage and thereby excluding same-sex couples). 
 60. See Raymond C. O’Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 166 (1995). 
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couples, employers soon discovered that providing domestic partnership 
benefits cost them little and yet it was a means by which they could retain skilled 
employees.  The practice expanded rapidly.61 Eventually cities and localities 
began offering domestic partnership benefits to same-sex employees, and then 
some municipalities mandated that employers could not conduct business with 
the locality if the company did not offer domestic partnership benefits.62  
Eventually, California would become the most populous state to offer domestic 
partnership to its citizens, enacting the Domestic Partnership Rights and 
Responsibilities Act of 2003.63  The state made its domestic partnership 
legislation as similar to marriage as it could, providing identical benefits and 
prerogatives.  The status continued in California until the state was permitted to 
offer marriage licenses for same-sex marriage. 
Opposition to same-sex couples receiving any type of state recognition 
galvanized persons on both sides of the argument.  Opponents argued that state 
benefits sanctioned immorality, pedophilia, and were a bad influence on children 
who may as a result choose to adopt that same-sex lifestyle.64  Advocates for 
same-sex status protections were energized by the opportunities and 
encouragement presented by business employers, local legislative gains, and 
constitutional rulings that seemed to open guarantees of economic and social 
status inclusion. The contest between the opposing views continued until the two 
sides confronted the issue of equal marriage rights for same-sex couples.  Until 
Obergefell, the most significant decision was Baehr v. Lewin,65 decided in 1993 
by the Hawaiian Supreme Court.  Relying on a 1967 Supreme Court decision 
permitting interracial marriage, the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the 
definition of marriage could continue to change with an evolving social order 
and custom.66  Until that decision, same-sex persons were denied a marriage 
license issuance that seemed warranted under Equal Protection, Due Process, or 
the penumbra of privacy.  Courts held that these guarantees were inapplicable 
because the definition of marriage as one man and one woman was immutable.67  
                                                          
 61. See id. at 177–81. 
 62. See id. at 181–84. 
 63. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).  California later enacted same-sex marriage, 
which was then rejected by the voters in Proposition 8, by which the state amended its constitution 
to define marriage as between one man and one woman.  Upon challenge, the amendment was ruled 
a violation of Equal Protection and same-sex marriage was then allowed.  See Perry v. Brown, 671 
F.3d 1052, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 64. See O’Brien, Family Law’s Challenge to Religious Liberty, supra note 46, at 45–49. 
 65. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  For the role of Baehr v. Lewin in the Obergefell decision, see 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596–97 (2015). 
 66. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63 (relying on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967)).  Chief 
Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Obergefell, alluded to the evolution rationale and questioned if the 
Court’s decision to permit same-sex unions will eventually evolve to permit polygamy.  See 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 67. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the 
Equal Rights Amendment and other constitutional safeguards are inapplicable because of the 
definition of marriage). 
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The Hawaiian court’s rationale made this definitional obstacle irrelevant, ruling 
that if marriage could evolve to include interracial couples then marriage could 
evolve to include same-sex couples as well.68  As with interracial marriage and 
Loving v. Virginia,69 the contemporary impact of the Hawaiian decision in Baehr 
permitting the definition of marriage to evolve and include same-sex couples 
was significant.  This decision cemented an irreversible change in analysis. 
Backlash against the Hawaiian decision was swift and vehement.  Opponents 
argued that same-sex marriage would (1) destroy the traditional institution of 
marriage, (2) that through Full Faith and Credit every state would be forced to 
adopt same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere, and (3) that any court’s 
requirement of same-sex marriage was a flagrant example of judicial activism.70  
Such arguments were heard in Hawaii, prompting the state’s legislature to act. 
Rather than permit same-sex marriage in the state, the Hawaiian legislature and 
the state’s voters reached a compromise with proponents of same-sex marriage 
by enacting a permeation of domestic partnerships.  As a result of the 
compromise, the state became the first to adopt “reciprocal beneficiaries,” a 
status made available solely to same-sex couples that sought to provide identical 
state benefits as those available to married couples.71   Nonetheless, as with 
domestic partnership, a simple registration procedure would entitle registrants 
to the status.72  The state constitution was amended to define marriage as 
between one man and one woman in return for the enactment of reciprocal 
beneficiaries.73  In spite of the fact that same-sex couples were still denied the 
ability to marry in the state, reciprocal beneficiary status was a significant 
achievement for adults seeking to establish a same-sex functional family.  This 
status and the rationale that precipitated it would continue a progression towards 
the eventual right to same-sex marriage in 2015.74 
The third permeation of status was civil unions.  This was an innovation 
adopted by the Vermont legislature on July 1, 2000, prompted by a decision of 
the Vermont Supreme Court holding that the Common Benefits Clause of the 
state constitution guaranteed to each citizen common economic benefits;75 same-
                                                          
 68. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67–68. 
 69. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 70. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality 
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1184–85 (2009).  These arguments are 
acknowledged in the Obergefell decision.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–07. 
 71. See Schacter, supra note 70, at 1166. 
 72. See  HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5 (West 1997). 
 73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 74. For the role of Baehr in the Obergefell analysis, see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97. 
 75. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).  In its Obergefell decision, the Court 
defined the benefits of marriage as including: taxation, inheritance and property rights, rules of 
intestate succession, spousal privilege in the law of evidence, hospital access, medical decision 
making authority, adoption rights, the rights to benefits of survivors, birth and death certificates, 
professional ethics rules, campaign finance restrictions, workers compensation benefits, health 
insurance, and child custody, support, and visitation rules.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601. 
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sex couples were now entitled to the same benefits as married opposite-sex 
couples.  In order to enter into a civil union a same-sex couple had to complete 
all of the requirements of an opposite-sex couple seeking to enter into 
marriage.76  Likewise, in order to bring about dissolution of the civil union the 
requirements were similar to divorce.77  Because civil unions attempted to 
provide all of the benefits of marriage, it was argued that the definition of 
“marriage” could be reserved for opposite-sex couples, permitting courts and 
legislatures to dodge the definitional issue.  The state felt satisfied that it could 
create a separate but equal status for same-sex couples, but civil unions instead 
became the last step in the road to same-sex marriage. 
Eventually, a few other states imitated Vermont’s civil unions, and it appeared 
for a while that this status would provide a status quo.78  But the hiatus was brief, 
and on May 17, 2004, Massachusetts, at the direction of the state’s highest court, 
began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.79  And Vermont, the state 
that initiated civil unions, then progressed beyond civil unions and became the 
first state to enact same-sex marriage as a result of a vote of the legislature and 
not because of judicial mandate.  Other states followed suit and a patchwork of 
same-sex marriage jurisdictions arose among the states, a patchwork that only 
ended with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on June 26, 2015 mandating 
same-sex marriage throughout the nation. 
The process from domestic partnership to same-sex marriage, taking more 
than thirty years, illustrates a process of accommodation of same-sex adults 
working through functional families and resulting in access to form family.  
Primarily, the benefits sought were economic, with only a passing reference 
made to parental status.  The process began with judicial recognition, then with 
employers, localities, and eventually states; all doing what was necessary to 
provide an increasing amount of economic status for persons denied similar 
benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples.  Once same-sex marriage became a 
reality, the availability of the intermediate status arrangements—domestic 
partnership, reciprocal beneficiary, and civil unions—were deemed 
unnecessary.  But until marriage was available, the status accommodations were 
oriented towards economic benefits for the functioning adult partners. 
Children born or adopted into same-sex unions were addressed under the 
“marriage-like” status arrangements enacted by the states, or they were 
accommodated through various court-fashioned equity arrangements such as 
                                                          
 76. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5131, 5137 (West 2000). 
 77. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 551, 1206 (West 2016). 
 78. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 202 (West 2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/20 (2011); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to 37:1-36 (West 2006).  Even Hawaii adopted civil unions.  See 2011 
Haw. Sess. Laws 232 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572B-1 to 572B-11 (2011)). 
 79. The decision to issue licenses was prompted by a decision from the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court holding that the state constitution’s guarantees of liberty and equality under the law 
mandated that same-sex couples be allowed to marry.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). 
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equitable estoppel, de facto parenthood, and psychological parenthood.80  
Domestic partnership, reciprocal beneficiaries, and civil unions are no longer 
needed in the same-sex functional family.  Does the availability of marriage 
eliminate the need for equitable accommodation when it comes to establishing 
parentage? 
B.  Nonmarital Children 
1.  Uniform Parentage Act Presumptions 
On many occasions functional families, both opposite and same-sex, have 
brought children into their households.  The 2010 Census Bureau reports that 
39% of unmarried opposite-sex couple households have their own children as 
part of their households, and seventeen percent of unmarried same-sex couple 
households have children present.81  The Census Bureau reports that in 2003, 
male couples raising children together were estimated to comprise nearly 
twenty-two percent of same-sex households.82  Same-sex marriage is now 
available to same-sex partners, and although marriage is not the exclusive means 
by which paternity may be established, a child conceived or born during 
marriage is presumptively the child of the husband.83  Marriage makes paternity 
and maternity so much easier. 
The UPA is the primary arbiter of parentage, not because it has been adopted 
in every state; but rather, because it culls together what states have already 
adopted as public policy.  Through its adoption and subsequent amendments, it 
serves as a catalyst too, and now recognizes that unmarried persons may become 
parents.  But the statutory provisions are narrow.  Article 2 of the Act, “Parent-
Child Relationship,” provides the means of establishing paternity under section 
                                                          
 80. See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508–09 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that 
equitable estoppel may be used by a nonparent seeking custody of a child and that a same-sex 
marriage in Canada assisted in this conclusion); Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682 
(App. Div. 1998) (holding that facts may determine that it is in the best interest of a child for a 
nonparent to have standing to pursue custody of that child).  But see Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 
N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that parenting rights and privileges given to 
nonparents in same-sex domestic partnerships must come from the legislature and not the courts). 
 81. Waggoner, supra note 58, at 57. 
 82. Jessica Hawkins, My Two Dads: Challenging Gender Stereotypes in Applying 
California’s Recent Supreme Court Cases to Gay Couples, 41 FAM. L.Q. 623, 631 (2007) (citing 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 9 
(2003)). 
 83. See, e.g., Estate of Cornelious, 674 P.2d 245, 246–48 (Cal. 1984); In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 
471, 473–75 (N.Y. 1930) (upholding an irrebutable presumption that a child born to a woman 
cohabiting with her not impotent husband is the child of her husband).  The marital presumption of 
paternity may be applied in a gender neutral fashion.  For application to same sex marriages, see, 
for example, Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *13 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2015); Stankevich v. Milliron, 882 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a 
spouse in a same-sex marriage has standing to raise the equitable-parent doctrine in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell). 
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201,84 and then in section 204 the statute provides presumptions that are meant 
to make it easier to establish parentage for a child.85  The Act makes distinctions 
based on a man or a woman, but gradually courts, when interpreting state 
adaptations of the Act, interpreted the provisions as gender neutral.86 
Overall, the Act provides that the paternity of the child may be established 
through acknowledgement of such,87 or if the presumed parent (in a gender 
neutral fashion) resides in the same household with the child during the first two 
years of the child’s life and openly holds the child out as his or her own,88 or if 
there is an adjudication of the person’s paternity/maternity.89  Second, an adult 
party to the relationship may adopt the child through statutory procedures.90  
Third, advances in assisted reproductive technology make it possible for an adult 
party to become a parent through assisted reproductive technology, and to 
include surrogacy contracts with a gestational carrier.91  And fourth, also 
involving assisted reproductive technology, a man or woman may become the 
parent of a child by consenting to assisted reproduction involving his or her 
partner that results in the birth of a child.92 
On its face, the Act provides an avenue for same-sex couples to establish 
parentage through consent to assisted reproduction, or through residing in the 
same household during the first two years of a child’s life and holding the child 
out as his or her own.93  But if the terms of the statute are read in a gender specific 
                                                          
 84. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 85. Id. § 204. 
 86. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
both man and woman could become parents through consent). 
 87. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“The mother of a child 
and a man claiming to be the genetic father of the child may sign an acknowledgement of paternity 
with intent to establish the man’s paternity.”).  This acknowledgement must, among other 
requirements, be signed by the mother and the man seeking to establish his paternity.  Id. § 302. 
 88. Id. § 204(a)(5); see, e.g., Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016) (holding 
that a person in a same-sex relationship may become a presumed parent under the terms of the 
statute). 
 89. Id. § 201(a)(2), (b)(3). 
 90. Id. § 201(a)(3), (b)(4); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-706 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (“A 
decree of adoption is a final order for purposes of appeal when it is issued and becomes final for 
other purposes upon the expiration of the time for filing an appeal, if no appeal is filed, or upon the 
denial or dismissal of any appeal filed within the requisite time.”). 
 91. Gestational agreements, if permitted in the jurisdiction where parentage is sought, may 
establish maternity or paternity under a valid gestational agreement.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
§§ 201(a)(4), (b)(6), 807 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).  Not all states permit surrogacy. 
 92. Id. § 201(b)(5); see, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding that both man and woman may become parents of a child born to a gestational carrier 
through consent in a gender neutral fashion); see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 665 
(Cal. 2005) (referencing same-sex couples); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 695–96 (Cal. 
2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005). 
 93. See, e.g., Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016) (holding that a woman in 
a same-sex relationship who held out the children of her partner as her own children, performing 
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fashion, it excludes same-sex couples.  In addition, not all states adopted the 
Act’s 2002 revision permitting paternity if the person resides in the same 
household and holds the child out as his or her own for a period of first two years 
of the child’s life.  To replicate this provision in the Act, a few states judicially 
or statutorily adopted de facto parenthood, which provides acceptance of 
caretaking responsibilities for a similar period of time.94  Faced with obstacles, 
state courts responded by refusing to take action or, on the contrary, fashioning 
equitable remedies to classify persons as parents even though they did not meet 
the statutory criteria. 
2.  Assisted Reproductive Technology Parentage 
Parentage through assisted reproductive technology is one means by which 
same-sex couples achieve parentage; adoption is the other.  In reference to 
assisted reproductive technology, rapid advances in medical procedures have 
resulted in enhanced opportunities for persons of the same sex seeking to 
become parents.  In a 2010 law review article, Professor Lee-ford Tritt discussed 
the 2008 revision to the Uniform Probate Code as it applied to establishing a 
parent-child relationship, noting the difficulty of legislation keeping pace with 
technological changes.95  He observed that “parentage is a much more 
complicated affair these days . . . DNA testing and advancements in ART 
[artificial reproductive technology] (such as sperm donations) make presuming 
and recognizing the father-child relationship more difficult as well.”96  Likewise, 
Professor Tritt explains, “it used to be that a mother-child relationship was self-
apparent, as the mother actually gave birth to the child.”97  But assisted 
reproductive technology makes motherhood less apparent.  For example, “egg 
donations and gestational surrogacy now make identifying a mother-child 
relationship more difficult.”98  And likewise, a father’s genetic connections 
always have been less apparent, so legal paternity traditionally has been inferred 
through a series of presumptions and legal defenses, but technological advances 
have created an increasing possibilities gap in establishing parentage.  For 
instance, “ART can achieve conception without sex, so people who want a child 
                                                          
the functions of a parent, was a presumed parent under the terms of the UPA adopted by the state 
in spite of the lack of a biological connection with the children). 
 94. See, e.g., Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 449–51 (Md. 2016) (adopting judicially, de 
facto parenthood and referencing other states doing likewise). 
 95. Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories 
Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2010). 
 96. Id. at 299; see also St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027, 1032 (Nev. 2013) (“Given the 
medical advances and changing family dynamics . . . determining a child’s parents today can be 
more complicated than it was in the past.”). 
 97. Tritt, supra note 95, at 299. 
 98. Id.  For a gestational agreements statute, see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Article 8 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2002).  For discussion generally, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: 
Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223 (2013). 
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may use sperm, ova, or gestational services that have been donated or sold.”99  
Because of expanding possibilities, children may have parentage connections to 
multiple adults: 
For instance, it is now possible for a child to have three potential 
“mothers”: the egg donor, the gestational surrogate, and the woman 
who plans the pregnancy and intends to raise the child as the legal 
mother.  It is also possible for a child to have three potential “fathers”: 
the sperm donor, the husband to the gestational surrogate, and the man 
who plans the pregnancy and intends to be legally recognized as the 
father.100 
California now acknowledges that it is possible for a child to have multiple 
legal parents: 
In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two persons 
with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court 
finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the 
child.  In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider 
all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing 
the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the 
child’s physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and 
affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of 
time.  A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of 
unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage.101 
As advances in assisted reproductive technologies continue, “their purveyors 
have been accused of operating in the ‘Wild West’ of American medicine.”102  
In addition, these advances have “coincided with a dramatic change in the legal 
conception of the family,”103 and the process of evolution continues.  Just as 
same-sex marriage is now legally possible, new technologies “may in the future 
allow two women to create a child with whom they both share an equal genetic 
link, without requiring any male genetic contribution, or two men to create a 
child with only a minimal female genetic contribution.”104  Such a procedure is 
a combination of two procedures, somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) and stem 
cell technology used in the context of two-parent families.105  As it pertains to 
                                                          
 99. Tritt, supra note 95, at 303. 
 100. Id. at 303–04. 
 101. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2004). 
 102. Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology: 
Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 107, 108 (2014). 
 103. Id. at 112.  For further commentary on the expanding definition of family through ART, 
see Myrisha S. Lewis, Biology, Genetics, Nurture, and the Law: The Expansion of the Legal 
Definition of Family to Include Three or More Parents, 6 NEV. L.J. 743 (2016). 
 104. Margalit et al., supra note 102, at 116–17. 
 105. Id. at 117 (“[T]he basic process is as follows: SCNT entails removing the original nucleus 
from an egg (which is then known as an ‘enucleated egg’) and replacing the nucleus with nuclear 
material from one or more individuals and sources.  After being induced to divide in a laboratory, 
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same-sex couples, the procedure would be accomplished in the following 
context: 
To create a child with two female genetic contributors, without the 
need for a male genetic contribution, one gamete-like cell would be 
taken from each of the two women.  Each cell would contain one-half 
of the forty-six chromosomes possessed by each woman.  The nucleus 
of each gamete-like cell would be inserted in a laboratory into an 
enucleated egg from one of the women to mimic a fertilization event.  
The resulting fertilized egg would then be implanted into one of the 
women to create a child with whom both women would share an equal 
genetic link.  This process would not require a male genetic 
contributor.106 
Such a procedure would be revolutionary, but it would make irrelevant the 
intent of the parties: 
[T]here would be no need for a contract, a parentage order from the 
court, reliance on de facto parentage, or second parent adoption.  The 
two women would be the sole biological parents of their child to the 
same degree as an opposite-sex couple, and there would be no 
additional third party to assert a biological claim of parenthood.107 
There are additional parentage-inducing reproductive technologies being 
discussed.  One is uterine transplantation, raising the possibility that “one day a 
uterus could be transplanted into a man.”108  This would permit two male genetic 
contributors to establish a parental claim without reference to a female.109  A 
second method to eliminate the need for a female gestational mother is human-
animal chimeric technology: “This process entails injecting specialized human 
stem cells into the fetus of a cow to generate an adult cow with a human uterus.  
Because the gestational period of a cow is nine months, this uterus could 
hypothetically support human embryonic gestation.”110  However, creating 
human life in an artificially created uterus has not been attempted because 
“[c]reating an artificial uterus for human beings is far more complicated, and it 
                                                          
the embryo, also known as a blastocyst, is then implanted into a uterus and allowed to gestate to 
form a complete organism.”). 
 106. Id. at 118.  The procedure for two men provides that: 
each man would contribute about one half of the genetic material to an enucleated egg 
contributed by a female donor. A woman, either the egg donor or another person, would 
have to gestate the child.  The majority of the egg’s DNA (i.e., the nuclear DNA) would 
be removed, though the egg would retain the women’s mitochondria DNA (mt-DNA), 
a minimal genetic contribution. 
Id. at 122. 
 107. Id. at 121. 
 108. Id. at 125. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 126. 
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is unclear whether the procedures being utilized in animals could be used to 
create an artificial human uterus.”111 
No matter how bizarre from a contemporary perspective, modern methods of 
reproductive technology most often share one thing in common with traditional 
paternity procedures—the biological connection between parent and child.  
Biology, such as giving birth to a child after a nine-month pregnancy is 
traditional and presumptions of maternity and paternity follow.  Likewise, if 
biology is absent then parenthood may be established through marriage.112  
Indeed, at least one U.S. Supreme Court decision is willing to ignore the clear 
scientific evidence of biology and adhere to traditional notions of family as 
preferred. 113 That is, when genetic certainty contradicts the presumption of 
paternity brought about through marriage, at least this decision of the Court 
holds that the integrity of the marital union trumps biology and the genetic 
evidence should be ignored.  If a child is born during an intact marriage, thereby 
entering into a family unit, genetic evidence should not be considered because 
of the inherent value in being a part of a family.114  This holding has been 
                                                          
 111. Id. 
 112. The UPA provides for a presumption of paternity to be established in a majority of its 
provisions: Man and woman are married when the child is born during the marriage; a child is born 
within 300 days of termination of the marriage; a marriage is annulled and a child is born within 
300 days of that void marriage; or the man and the woman married each other after the birth of the 
child and the man promised to support the child or is named as a parent on the child’s birth 
certificate.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)–(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 113. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that a 
California statute prohibits “inquiries into child’s paternity that would be destructive of family 
integrity and privacy”); see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2015) (establishing the conclusive 
presumption of paternity).  Rebuttal with blood tests is provided under the California Family Code: 
(a) Notwithstanding Section 7540, if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, 
as disclosed by the evidence based on blood tests performed pursuant to Chapter 2 
(commencing with Section 7550), are that the husband is not the father of the child, the 
question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly. 
(b) The notice of motion for blood tests under this section may be filed not later than two 
years from the child’s date of birth by the husband, or for the purposes of establishing 
paternity by the presumed father or the child through or by the child’s guardian ad litem. 
As used in this subdivision, “presumed father” has the meaning given in Sections 7611 
and 7612. 
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under this section may be filed by the mother of 
the child not later than two years from the child’s date of birth if the child’s biological 
father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the child. 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 2015). 
 114. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (holding that a California statute, specifying that any 
child born to a married man and his wife while they cohabit is presumed to be the father of that 
child, does not violate due process rights of a man who has been established as a genetic father 
when the statute restricts rebuttal to the husband and wife in only limited circumstances).  For a 
critique of this decision, see for example, id. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Laurence H. Tribe & 
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1085–
98 (1990); see also Ex Parte C.A.P., 683 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Ala. 1996) (holding that putative 
father cannot challenge paternity of child born, but not conceived, during marriage); In re Melissa 
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criticized, but the greater challenge will come from continuing advances in 
genetic identification in the future.  The presumptions ensconced in the UPA 
were born of necessity; it was otherwise impossible to establish paternity.  But 
scientific advances continue to advance both certainty and faster results. 
3.  De Facto, Contractual, and Equitable Parentage 
Increasingly, states have adopted equitable or statutory means by which 
nonparents may achieve parental status other than through adoption.  One 
commentator summarizes that, “[t]oday, only three jurisdiction appear to remain 
committed to doctrines denying custodial responsibilities altogether to third 
parties who have engaged in day-to-day residential caretaking in a parenting 
capacity, and the decisions expressing this commitment are lesbian-coparent 
cases, reflecting a special resistance to this particular family arrangement.”115  
Likewise, two jurisdictions limit recognition of de facto parenthood to situations 
when the de facto parent was married to the parent.116 
De facto parenthood, statutory and judicial, is one of the means by which to 
establish parenthood when adult parties could neither marry nor biologically 
participate in the conception of a child.  This extends the boundaries of 
parenthood because the “modern basis for awarding legal parenthood is 
biological kinship and the marital presumption.”117  But as will be discussed, 
infra, de facto parenthood offers an additional means of achieving parenthood.  
An illustration of the use of statutory de facto parenthood is found in the 
Delaware Supreme Court decision of Smith v. Gordon.118  The decision 
concerned two women who had been partners for five years when they decided 
to adopt a child from Kazakhstan.119  Same-sex couples could not adopt in that 
country so one of the women adopted the child and the couple returned to the 
United States with the adopted child.120  Once in the United States, the other 
partner enrolled the child in her health insurance plan and paid for his expenses 
                                                          
G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the child should be placed in foster care rather 
than with presumed father); David V.R. v. Wanda J.D., 907 P.2d 1025, 1027–28 (Okla. 1995); 
Pearson v. Pearson, 182 P.3d 353, 359 (Utah 2008) (holding that putative father could not challenge 
paternity of child upon the mother’s divorce).  
 115. Katharine T. Bartlett, Prioritizing Past Caretaking in Child-Custody Decisionmaking, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 66 (2014).  The three jurisdictions are Maryland, Missouri, and Utah.  
Id. at 66 n.224.  But the number of states drops to two as Maryland judicially adopted de facto 
parenthood on July 7, 2016.  See generally Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016). 
 116. The two jurisdictions are New York and Michigan.  Bartlett, supra note 115, at 66 n.225. 
 117. Margalit et al., supra note 102, at 113.  Of course, statutory adoption may also establish 
parenthood, but one form of adoption, second parent adoption, was unavailable to many same-sex 
couples because second parent adoption necessitates a valid marriage between the biological parent 
and the person seeking to adopt. 
 118. 968 A.2d 1 (Del. 2009). 
 119. Id. at 3. 
 120. Id. 
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even though she did not adopt the child in the United States.121  When the couple 
subsequently ended their relationship the adopting parent refused to allow her 
former partner visitation with her child and the partner initiated a lengthy 
litigious struggle seeking visitation rights.122  Initially, the Delaware Supreme 
Court upheld the rights of the adopting parent and refused visitation by the 
nonparent.123  But the state legislature enacted a de facto parenthood statute and 
the court applied it retroactively to grant the former nonadopting partner parental 
status.124  In doing so the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged that the state’s 
legislature created an additional form of parentage when it enacted statutory de 
facto parenthood.125  Other states have adopted de facto parenthood through 
common law.126 
In the absence of statutory or judicial formulations of de facto parenthood, or 
in rare instances, marriage or adoption, same-sex couples “have had to rely on 
contract law and equitable principles to validate their parental claims.”127  Clear 
and convincing proof of their intent to be the parents of a child is required, and 
proof very often resulted in “contentious litigation and requires courts to delve 
inappropriately into the hearts and minds of the parties.”128  Such contention led 
one court to require a test of objectivity, to create “a bright-line rule that 
promotes certainty in the wake of domestic breakups otherwise fraught with the 
risk of ‘disruptive . . . battle’ over parentage as a prelude to further potential 
                                                          
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 3–4. 
 123. Id. at 16. 
 124. See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 924, 936 (Del. 2011).  The court cited to the recently 
enacted Delaware Uniform Parentage Act: 
De facto parent status is established if the Family Court determines that the de facto 
parent: 
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who fostered the 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de 
facto parent; 
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is defined in § 1101 of 
this title; and 
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded 
and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2016). 
 125. Smith, 16 A.3d at 935. 
 126. See, e.g., Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 450–51 (Md. 2016). 
 127. Margalit et al., supra note 102, at 114.  Contract claims are discussed in the context of 
agreements and equitable claims are discussed in the context of extraordinary circumstances, 
psychological parenthood, and in loco parentis.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 128. Margalit et al., supra note 102, at 135; see, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1072–73 
(Mass. 2006) (holding that one of the two lesbians who helped raise the child but shared neither a 
marriage nor a biological connection with the child had insufficient caretaking activities with the 
child to establish herself as a de facto parent or a parent by estoppel). 
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combat over custody and visitation.”129  Sadly, bright lines of objectivity are rare 
in the milieu of functional families. 
As will be discussed, infra, there are very few options available to courts to 
satisfy the equities of both adult parties and the best interest of the child or 
children involved.  Throughout the years, when the number and viability of 
functional families were increasing, courts took note of the realities involved 
and began to develop approaches, and in a few cases, rules.  A similar approach 
was taken with the economic interests of functional families.  Most of the cases 
involved same-sex couples.  Fewer opposite-sex couples were involved, perhaps 
because they were able to marry, acknowledge paternity, and procreate through 
intercourse—oblivious to surrogacy contracts, adoption, or egg and sperm 
donations.  Same-sex couples, through litigation and a few legislative 
enactments, were able to assert parental claims based on equitable principles 
involving intent, explicit or implied.  And yes, these equitable and smattering of 
legislative advances can continue, but are they needed now that same-sex 
marriage is available?  Like domestic partnerships, perhaps the time has passed 
for reciprocal beneficiaries and civil unions, and it is necessary, at a minimum 
to avoid contentious litigation, for same-sex couples to embrace marriage and 
the presumptions marriage provides.  Has costly and lengthy litigation, along 
with intrusive private scrutiny and the best interests of the child, provided 
reasons enough to abandon equitable arguments and adopt the objectivity of 
marriage as the gateway to parenthood?  To answer this question, it is necessary 
to examine the scope of the equitable arrangements that have arisen over the past 
five decades. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF EQUITABLE PARENTAGE 
A.  Fundamental Rights of Parents 
1.  The Pivotal Role of Troxel 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “[th]e Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause has a substantive component that ‘provides heightened 
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests,’ . . . including parents’ fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”130  The Court 
characterized the fundamental rights of parents as “perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”131  And even though the 
                                                          
 129. Debra H. v. Janie R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 191–92 (N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted).  But see 
Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498–501 (2016) (departing from the bright line 
test and permitting establishment of parental status through, at a minimum, a pre-conceptions 
agreement between adult parties). 
 130. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2056 (2000). 
 131. Id. at 2060.  The Court referenced several cases in its characterization of parental rights 
as a fundamental liberty.  See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating that 
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plurality decision was vague in its application,132 a series of subsequent judicial 
opinions and statutory enactments ratified the Court’s holding.133  The holding 
rejected the petition of the grandparents seeking visitation with their 
grandchildren.  Specifically, the Court held: 
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is 
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into 
the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that 
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that 
parent’s children.134 
Only by proving that the parent is unfit, or that the third party qualifies as a 
parent, may the state intervene against the wishes of a fit parent to enforce the 
visitation rights of a third party.135  Troxel presumes that a fit parent always acts 
in the best interest of his or her child, hence what is in the best interest of a child 
is only a topic of inquiry when a parent is judged unfit. 
The Troxel decision illustrates the pursuit of parentage status by persons in a 
relationship that involves children with whom these petitioners have no parental 
relationship through adoption, marriage, or biology.  Specifically, the facts 
involve grandparents who loved and cared for their granddaughters since birth 
and were denied visitation by the children’s biological mother.  Grandparent 
petitions for visitation or custody of grandchildren occur frequently and these 
petitions resemble those of former same-sex partners seeking to visit with a child 
or children with whom they have bonded.136  All petitions by third parties are 
subject to the constitutional parameters established in Troxel. 
                                                          
the right of a parent to “direct the education and upbringing” of their children is protected by the 
Due Process Clause); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing the fundamental 
right of parents to care and manage their children); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) 
(recognizing that parents have broad authority of their children); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 
255 (1978) (“[T]he relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that the Court respects the interests of parents in 
managing the care and custody of their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) 
(stating that the parental role in raising children is an “American Tradition”). 
 132. See, e.g., Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2064 (“[W]e do not consider the primary constitutional 
question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court—whether the Due Process Clause requires 
all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a 
condition precedent to granting visitation.  We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope 
of the parental due process right in the visitation context.” (emphasis added)). 
 133. See, e.g., Weldon v. Ballow, 200 So. 3d 654, 672 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (holding that the 
Alabama state statute did not meet the Troxel test when it did not sufficiently provide for the 
parental presumption); Falconer v. Stamps, 886 N.W.2d 23, 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that 
the trial court improperly granted visitation to grandparents in part because the court did not give 
preference to the parental presumption mandated by Troxel).  But see Suarez v. Williams, 26 
N.Y.3d 440, 444 (2015) (holding that extraordinary circumstances may rebut the parental 
presumption and provide a nonparent with standing to seek custody of a child); CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 3041 (West 2013) (listing factors that may rebut the parental presumption). 
 134. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2061. 
 135. Id. at 2061–62. 
 136. Id. at 2059. 
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One case, Debra H. v. Janice R.,137 is illustrative of the process and the pivotal 
role that Troxel plays in any resolution of a dispute between two same-sex 
partners—a parent and a nonparent.  The case involved two women who met in 
2002 and resided in New York.  In 2003, they traveled to Vermont and entered 
into a civil union where the status of civil unions had been enacted for same-sex 
couples.138  Immediately afterwards the two women returned to New York and 
continued their residence there.  In that same year, Janice R. gave birth to a boy 
through artificial insemination using a donor’s sperm.  The birth mother’s 
partner was Debra H. and she consistently rebuffed all entreaties by the birth 
mother for Debra to become the boy’s second parent through the process of 
adoption.139  Then, in 2006, Janice and Debra separated but Janice permitted 
Debra limited physical visitation with the boy until 2008 when she discontinued 
any and all communications between her biological son and her former 
partner.140  The refusal to allow Debra to visit with the boy prompted Debra to 
file suit to obtain “joint legal and physical custody of [the boy], restoration of 
access and decisionmaking authority with respect to his upbringing, and 
appointment of an attorney for the child.”141 
The Court of Appeals of New York, the state’s highest court, acknowledged 
prior state precedent, specifically the 1991 decision of Alison D. v. Virginia 
M.,142 which established an objective standard, eschewing equitable grounds and 
holding that “only a child’s biological or adoptive parent has standing to seek 
visitation against the wishes of a fit custodial parent . . . .”143 Then the court in 
Debra H. ruled that any entitlement to custody or visitation rights for persons 
not related to the child through biology or adoption only arises because of a valid 
                                                          
 137. 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010).  But see Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 
501 (N.Y. 2016) (holding that more subjective tests could be utilized to establish parenthood in the 
future). 
 138. Debra H. v. Janie R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 186–87 (N.Y. 2010). 
 139. Id. at 186. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. (alteration in original). 
 142. 527 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). 
 143. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 187 (discussing the holding of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 527 
N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991)).  The court in Debra H. affirmed its holding in Alison D. because was 
“convinced that the predictability of parental identity fostered by Alison D. benefits children and 
the adults in their lives.”  Id. at 192.  However, the Court in Brooke S.B. overruled Alison D. and 
abrogated Debra H., and held that more subjective factors may lead to the establishment of 
parenthood.  Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498–501 (N.Y. 2016).  For a 
discussion of how the New York Court of Appeals misconstrued the Vermont decision of Miller-
Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006), see Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children 
Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 638 (2012); Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying 
Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671, 
689 (2012) (“Parentage was not assigned to [the nonparent] based solely on the civil union; in fact; 
the court expressly rejected that approach and looked instead at a variety of factors.” (alteration in 
original)); Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Protection of the 
Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2012). 
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marriage between the biological parent and the nonparent seeking custody or 
visitation.  The court considered the civil union a marriage and because the child 
was born to the birth mother during their marriage, the nonparent was presumed 
to be a parent under the state’s parentage act.144  Under Vermont law, when two 
persons of the same sex enter into a civil union in that state, both parties enjoy 
the status of parent if a child is born through assisted reproductive technology 
even though one of the parties has no biological connection with the child.145 
The court noted that Alison D. was decided in 1991, before the status of civil 
unions became available to same-sex couples.146  And the court noted it was 
pertinent to Debra H., and distinctive in comparison to Alison D., that Janice and 
Debra had entered into a valid civil union in Vermont,147 a status that conferred 
on them all of the rights of a married couple.148  Because Janice’s biological 
child was born through assisted reproductive technology, with the consent of her 
civil union partner, the nonparent civil union partner became a parent and 
entitled to that status in any dispute over custody or visitation.  As a parent, 
Debra shared a level playing field with the biological parent, Janice, and the 
issue then became what is in the best interest of the child.  The court stated that 
“[o]ur determination that Debra H. is [the child’s] parent allows her to seek 
visitation and custody at a best-interest hearing.  There, she [has] to establish 
facts demonstrating a relationship with [the child] that warrants an award in her 
favor.”149 
The 2010 decision of Debra H. is pertinent because the court explained why 
equitable remedies, such as equitable estoppel and psychological parenthood, do 
not serve the interests of the child or the parents.  As the New York court 
acknowledged, the lower court ruled that, if the facts justified it, Debra had “‘a 
prima facie basis for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel.’”150  The lower 
court ordered that Debra be given the opportunity to prove that she stood in loco 
parentis to the boy, and if so, then she “possessed standing to seek visitation and 
custody.”151  But, on appeal, the appellate court reversed the lower court and 
ruled that the objective standard of Alison D. should prevail, holding that any 
person not related to the child through adoption or biology “lacks standing to 
                                                          
 144. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 195. 
 145. Id.  The court acknowledges that Vermont permitted civil unions to confer “all the same 
benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”  
Id. (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a)). 
 146. Id. at 196. 
 147. Id. at 186.  The lower court ruled that because civil unions are similar to marriage, and 
because marriage would confer the benefits of parentage if a child were born during the marriage, 
Debra should be a parent of the boy.  Id. at 187–88. 
 148. The court granted comity to the Vermont civil union and, as such, recognized parentage 
created by a civil union in Vermont.  Id. at 197. 
 149. Id. (alteration in original). 
 150. Id. at 187 (citation omitted). 
 151. Id. at 188. 
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seek custody or visitation rights . . . .”152  When asked to choose between the 
holding of the lowest court or the appellate court, New York’s highest court 
chose the objective standard and rejected outright the equitable remedies favored 
by many other jurisdictions.  The crucial factor in its decision was the objectivity 
of the civil union, a status similar to marriage, entered into by the two adults.153  
And now that marriage is available to same-sex couples, the necessity of 
utilizing equitable remedies, at least in New York, is called into question.154  The 
court offered a basis for its rationale.  Without an objective element, parties 
would be forced into contentious litigation that would be costly and lengthy.155  
Such litigation would “trap single biological and adoptive parents and their 
children in a limbo of doubt.”156  The court then affirmed the overriding import 
of Troxel—affirming the fundamental right of a parent, objectively established 
through biology, adoption, or marriage in reference to artificial insemination—
to reject any parental status being awarded to another, even if that parent 
permitted or encouraged another adult to become a virtual parent of the child.157 
But in 2016, the Court of Appeals of New York overruled Alison D., holding 
that “the definition of ‘parent’ established by this Court 25 years ago in Alison 
D. has become unworkable when applied to increasingly varied familial 
relationships.”158  The decision of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.159 involved 
two same-sex couples, each of which had formed an intimate nonmarital 
relationship and had a child born to one of the partners.  In facts that are often 
repeated in other cases, the partners separated and eventually the biological 
parent prohibited her former partner, the one lacking any biological or adoptive 
connection with the child, to visit with the child.  This refusal prompted litigation 
seeking visitation and custody.  Both Alison D. and Debra H. would prohibit 
their status as parents, thus denying the case’s two nonbiological partners a 
relationship with the child they raised together with the biological parent.  But 
in reversing Alison D. the New York court held that 
Alison D.’s foundational premise of heterosexual parenting and 
nonrecognition of same-sex couples is unsustainable, particularly in 
light of the enactment of same-sex marriage in New York State, and 
                                                          
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 195, 197. 
 154. Id. at 196–97; see Stankevich v. Milliron, 868 N.W.2d 907 (Mich. 2015) (remanding a 
child custody decision because of Obergefell, holding that same-sex marriages had to be recognized 
and therefore the plaintiff in the case had to be considered a parent as a result of her marriage in 
Canada to the child’s biological parent). 
 155. Id. at 192 (“These equitable-estoppel hearings—which would be followed by a second, 
best-interest hearing in the event functional or de facto parentage is demonstrated to the trial court’s 
satisfaction—are likely often to be contentious, costly, and lengthy.”). 
 156. Id. at 193. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 61 N.E.3d 488, 499 (N.Y. 2016) (citing the increasing number of children being raised by 
same-sex couples in New York). 
 159. Id. 
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the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
which noted that the right to marry provides benefits not only for 
same-sex couples, but also the children being raised by those 
couples.160 
Because Debra H.’s holding was premised upon the marital status of the two 
same-sex partners; it was not overruled.  But the holding in Brooke S.B. departed 
from the preference for the “bright line” approach towards establishing 
parenthood.  Indeed, the court held that because the partners in each of the two 
factual scenarios involved entered into preconception agreements to conceive a 
child as coparents, the nonbiological partner is a parent for purposes of seeking 
visitation or custody.161  But the exact test to be employed in all situations is 
vague, unlike that employed in Alison D. and relied upon in Debra H.  Instead, 
the New York court held: “We reject the premise that we must now declare that 
one test would be appropriate for all situations . . . .”162  Clearly, because each 
of the couples could clearly and convincingly prove that they had entered into a 
preconception agreement whereby the nonbiological partner would be a parent, 
that person is a parent under Brooke S.B.  But “we do not opine on the proper 
test, if any, to be applied in situations in which a couple has not entered into a 
pre-conception agreement.”163 
The approach taken by Brooke S.B. does not delve deeply into the rationale 
behind that same court’s decision in Debra H., a decision that curtailed lengthy 
litigation by adhering to objective statutory standards.  Like Brooke S.B., the 
2010 decision of Debra H. acknowledged that, first, there are both statutory and 
equitable means by which parentage may be established.  Second, Debra H. 
preferred and adopted a “bright line” approach, establishing objective criteria 
provided by the state’s statute to establish parentage: marriage, biology, or 
adoption.  The reasons underlying Debra H. are cogent and based upon the 
court’s consideration of the best interest of the child, the cost and delay of 
litigation, and the uncertainty surrounding many cases. Yet the New York court 
rejected the “bright line” approach, finding that “bright lines cast a harsh light 
on any injustice and . . . there is little doubt by whom that injustice has been 
most finely felt and most finely perceived . . . .”164  Third, as often occurs in 
judicial opinions, Debra H. suggests that any additions to establishing parentage 
status must come from the legislature and not from the courts, but this was absent 
in the majority opinion of Brooke S.B.  A reference to legislation in the 
concurring opinion of Brooke S.B.165 comports with the heretofore policy in New 
                                                          
 160. Id. at 498. 
 161. Id. at 498–501. 
 162. Id. at 500. 
 163. Id. at 501. 
 164. Id. at 498–99. 
 165. Id. at 504–05 (Pigott, J., concurring).  Judge Pigott went on to state: “As we have said 
before, ‘any change in the meaning of ‘parent’ under our law should come by way of legislative 
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York announced in both Alison D. and Debra H.  Fourth, both Debra H. and 
Brooke S.B. recognized that Troxel is the gateway to custody and visitation 
claims.166  Persons seeking any rights pertaining to children must satisfy the 
requirement of Troxel by establishing, one way or another, parental status.  And 
fifth, the dispute among the states remains whether parenthood is established 
through objective factors, such as de facto parenthood or statutory status.  The 
fact that New York established an evolving test for parenthood in Brooke S.B. 
does not negate the fact that other states find that the best interest of a child is 
better protected with objectivity.167 
Equity has often complemented statutory definitions of parent.  Nonetheless, 
the use of equity is rare, accompanied by attenuating circumstances, and 
characterized by protracted litigation, expense, and emotional trauma.  What 
follows is a sampling of equitable remedies that, if successful, may establish the 
status of parenthood for a petitioner otherwise unable to rebut the presumptive 
requirements of Troxel. 
2.  Rebutting Troxel: The Equitable Remedies 
a.  Extraordinary Circumstances 
Although it would appear that the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Troxel 
precluded all third parties from exercising parental rights over a child, 
specifically in regard to the right sought in Troxel (visitation); commentators 
suggest that this is not the case.  According to Professor Katharine Bartlett, “the 
Court’s plurality did not preclude the rights of third parties who had served in a 
de facto capacity with respect to the child . . . .”168  But the parameters of a “de 
facto capacity” status, and those who may successfully challenge parental rights, 
remains murky.169  Certain situations have occurred that appear to warrant court 
interference with parental rights.  One of these is when extraordinary 
                                                          
enactment rather than judicial revamping of precedent.’”  Id. at 501 (quoting Debra H. v. Janice R., 
14 N.Y.3d 576, 596 (2010)). 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 498–99 (referencing Troxel and discussing the competing liberty interests 
of children). 
 167. See, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1076 (Mass. 2006).  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, in an opinion denying the estoppel claim of a nonparent seeking custody, opined 
that “we find general estoppel principles, while appropriate for commercial transactions, an 
unwieldy and inappropriate tool by which a judge may probe into the intimate, private realm of 
family life.”  Id. 
 168. Bartlett, supra note 115, at 58.  Professor Bartlett cites to two of the three dissenting 
opinions in the Troxel decision.  Id. at 58 n.171.  Justice Stevens’ dissent posits a “once-custodial 
caregiver” as someone constitutionally permitted to have parental status.  See Troxel v. Granville, 
120 S. Ct. 2054, 2070 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy suggests a de facto parent 
would be granted status as a parent.  Id. at 2077, 2079 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 169. For a cogent analysis of the evolution of de facto parentage and the Troxel decision, see 
Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding that an early de facto statute 
was unconstitutional). 
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circumstance arise.  Unlike some states that have codified de facto status,170 the 
parameters of extraordinary circumstances are elusive, but when they are 
present, a nonparent may obtain the status of parent in pursuing the best interest 
of a child, specifically seeking custody or visitation.  In determining what 
constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, it appears that a third party’s 
involvement with the child is not the sole criteria.  Rather, extraordinary 
circumstances exist whenever there is clear and convincing evidence that 
granting parental status to the nonparent would be in the best interest of the child 
because of facts pertaining to the child.171  A few illustrations of extraordinary 
circumstances include the following: (1) a child’s detrimental reliance, (2) 
transfer of parental status, (3) coparenting agreements, and (4) presumptive 
parentage. 
i.  Child’s Detrimental Reliance 
An illustration of how a child may be adversely affected by a parental 
relationship resulting in extraordinary circumstances is from the New York 
Court of Appeals, Bennett v. Jeffreys.172  The case involved a child who had been 
born eight years earlier to a then fifteen-year-old unwed girl.  The unwed teenage 
girl found herself unable to care for the child and despondent over her 
predicament.  Upon the recommendation of her own mother, she transferred the 
infant to a former classmate of her mother who then raised the little girl as her 
own for almost nine years.173  There was never a formal surrender to the third 
party, and the custodian of the girl never formally adopted the infant.  In 
addition, there was conflicting evidence as to the amount of contact that the 
biological mother and child had during the intervening years.  Nonetheless, the 
biological mother completed college, was still living with her parents, and 
sought the return of her child from the child’s custodian after almost nine years.  
The custodian refused to voluntarily surrender the child and, because of her 
lengthy relationship with the child as her parent, petitioned the court to be treated 
as a parent in any hearing concerning the best interest of the child.  The 
biological mother disagreed and asserted her parental rights, contesting any 
parenthood claimed by the custodian. 
The decision was decided prior to Troxel, but even prior to Troxel the parental 
presumption was ensconced in American jurisprudence.  Nonetheless, the court 
                                                          
 170. See infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 171. See, e.g., In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 148 (W.Va. 2005).  The court in Clifford K. 
utilized W. VA. CODE § 48-9-103(b), which provides: “In exceptional cases the court may, in its 
discretion, grant permission to intervene to other persons or public agencies who participation in 
the proceedings under this article it determines is likely to serve the child’s best interests.” 
 172. 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976); see also T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 919–20 (Pa. 2001) 
(holding that parental status is achieved if a nonparent is treated as a parent by both the parent and 
the child); In re C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 258–59 (Colo. 1995) (holding that parental status is achieved 
if the nonparent performs caretaking functions and the child psychologically identifies with the 
nonparent as a parent). 
 173. Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 280. 
2016] Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families 395 
recognized that there were rebuttals to this parental presumption.  Both 
presumption and the possibility of rebuttals were recognized in the court’s 
ruling: “The parent has a ‘right’ to rear its child, and the child has a ‘right’ to be 
reared by its parent.  However, there are exceptions created by extraordinary 
circumstances, illustratively, surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, 
unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary disruption of custody over an extended 
period of time.”174  Viewed from within these circumstances, the court held that 
in the case of the girl separated from her mother for eight years, “there were 
extraordinary circumstances present, namely, the protracted separation of 
mother from child, combined with the mother’s lack of an established household 
of her own, her unwed state, and the attachment of the child to the custodian.”175  
These extraordinary circumstances allowed the court to hold that the mother’s 
parental presumption was successfully rebutted by the third party, permitting the 
court to proceed to a hearing on whether it would be in the best interest of the 
child to return to the mother or to remain with the custodian.176 
At the best interest of the child hearing, the court held that the emotional bond 
the child maintained with the custodian was sufficient to conclude that “to 
remove the child from such a relationship would endanger the development of 
the child in many ways and could affect her academic success and her motivation 
to learn.”177  Thus, after rebutting the parental presumption with “extraordinary 
circumstances” and a best interest determination, the court held that the child 
should remain in the custody of the long-time custodial parent.178 
The Bennett decision illustrates the concern voiced by the New York Court of 
Appeals in its 2010 decision of Debra H.179  The Debra H. court was concerned 
that “equitable estoppel hearings—which would be followed by a second, best-
interest hearing in the event functional or de facto parentage is demonstrated to 
the trial court’s satisfaction—are likely often to be contentious, costly, and 
lengthy.”180  Such concern was illustrated in the litigation occasioned by the 
Bennet decision, where the court found that “[t]he new hearing extended over a 
four-week period and contain[ed] the testimony of some 26 witnesses . . . .”181 
Eventually, the New York legislature did enact a statute codifying 
extraordinary circumstances, at least as the circumstances apply to grandparents, 
and it included the concept of objectivity.182  The state statute was instrumental 
in the 2015 decision of Suarez v. Williams.183  Suarez involved a boy who had 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 281. 
 175. Id. at 284. 
 176. Id. at 285. 
 177. Bennett v. Marrow, 59 A.D.2d 492, 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
 178. Id. at 496. 
 179. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 180. Debra H. v. Janice R., 940 N.E.2d 184, 192 (N.Y. 2010). 
 181. Bennett, 59 A.D.2d at 494. 
 182. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2016). 
 183. 44 N.E.3d 915 (N.Y. 2015). 
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been born to an unmarried couple, but the child’s paternal grandparents played 
a pivotal role in the child’s life from birth until he was ten-years-old.184  The 
child’s father had moved out of state two years after the child was born and the 
mother permitted the child to live with the grandparents while she and children 
from another relationship lived nearby.  She often saw the child, but the 
grandparents made all the major decisions in the child’s life.  At one point, she 
and the child’s father had a court hearing to determine custody, but the 
grandparents did not participate.185  Later, after she began a relationship with a 
new boyfriend, she brought the child to live with her, and refused to allow the 
grandparents contact with their grandchild, prompting the grandparents to 
petition the court for visitation rights under a state statute enacted in 2004.186 
The court, searching for objectivity but mindful of the extraordinary 
circumstances rebutting the parental presumption in Bennett, ruled in favor of 
the grandparents, holding that “the grandparents established their standing to 
seek custody of the child by demonstrating extraordinary circumstances, namely 
an extended disruption of the mother’s custody, in accordance with Matter of 
Bennett v. Jeffreys and Domestic Relations Law § 72(2).”187  The extraordinary 
circumstances of Bennett were defined by the statute’s objective standard of the 
mother’s voluntary “extended disruption of custody” for at least twenty-four 
                                                          
 184. Id. at 917. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW Section 72 provides the following: 
(2)(a) Where a grandparent or the grandparents of a minor child, residing within this 
state, can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court the existence of extraordinary 
circumstances, such grandparent or grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme 
court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such 
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than twenty-four months. 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2016). 
 187. Suarez, 44 N.E.3d at 923.  In the concurring opinion of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 
Judge Pigott wrote that he would have decided in favor of the non-biological petitioner on the basis 
of extraordinary circumstances, rather than modifying the statutory definition of parent.  Brooke 
S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 502–04 (N.Y. 2016) (Pigott, J., concurring). 
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months.188  The fact that she visited with her son during this period of time did 
not overcome the fact that all major decisions in the child’s life were made by 
the grandparents. 
ii.  Transfer of Parental Status 
Other state courts have utilized an additional means to rebut the fundamental 
right of a parent to the custody and control of that parent’s child.  This may occur 
whenever a parent voluntarily transfers the status of parent to a nonparent, which 
may be viewed as a form of extraordinary circumstances.  For example, in the 
2010 decision of Boseman v. Jarrell,189 the North Carolina Supreme Court held 
that “when a parent brings a nonparent into the family unit, represents that the 
nonparent is a parent, and voluntarily gives custody of the child to the nonparent 
without creating an expectation that the relationship would be terminated, the 
parent has acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status.”190  The child 
in question had been born through artificial insemination to a same-sex couple.  
From the child’s birth in 2002 until their separation in 2006, the couple worked 
together as parents.  The nonparent attempted to adopt the child with the consent 
of the birth parent, but the court held that the adoption procedure the couple 
employed was void because it did not meet the requirements of the state’s 
adoption statute.191  Eventually the couple separated and the biological parent 
restricted contact between the child and the nonparent, prompting the nonparent 
to petition the court for visitation rights with the child.  Because the nonparent’s 
attempt at adoption was void and there was no biological connection, the 
nonparent sought to establish parental status through equitable means. 
The court held that the nonparent should be treated as a parent because of the 
voluntary transfer of parental status from the parent to the nonparent.192  The 
court concluded that both women enjoyed parental status, allowing for the court 
to proceed to a determination of what would be in the best interest of the child 
in apportioning custody between the two former partners.193  The deciding factor 
of the court was the extraordinary amount of parenting status that was given to 
the nonparent.194  The court held: 
The record in the case . . . indicates that defendant [biological parent] 
intentionally and voluntarily created a family unit in which plaintiff 
was intended to act—and acted—as a parent.  The parties jointly 
decided to bring a child into their relationship, worked together to 
conceive a child, chose the child’s first name together, and gave the 
child a last name that “is a hyphenated name composed of both parties’ 
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 189. 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010). 
 190. Id. at 503 (citing Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1997)). 
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last names.”  The parties also publicly held themselves out as the 
child’s parents at a baptismal ceremony and to their respective 
families.  The record also contains ample evidence that defendant 
allowed plaintiff and the minor child to develop a parental 
relationship.195 
In affirming the parental rights of the nonparent, the decision also illustrates 
concerns voiced by the court in Debra H.—that equitable approaches to 
parenthood create contentious and lengthy litigation.  In Boseman, the decision 
of the North Carolina Supreme Court occurred four years after the partners 
separated.  In the intervening, four years the district court had granted the mother 
and her former partner joint legal custody and awarded the mother primary 
physical custody.  The state appellate court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded, leaving intact the trial court’s custody determination. The mother 
then appealed, seeking discretionary review, which was granted.196  Upon 
review the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the non-biological parent 
was not a legally recognized parent, but was nonetheless entitled to seek 
visitation and custody of the child under “the best interest of the child” 
standard.197  Boseman illustrates the cost of seeking parenthood through more 
subjective means. 
New York’s 2016 decision in Brooke S.B. held that because there was clear 
and convincing proof that a same-sex couple entered into preconception 
agreement to conceive and raise a child together, the nonbiological, nonadoptive 
partner has standing as a parent.198  The level of proof provides a modicum of 
objectivity, but the future in New York is more murky due to the fact that the 
court held further, “we do not opine on the proper test, if any, to be applied in 
situations in which a couple has not entered into a pre-conception agreement.”199 
iii.  Coparenting Agreements 
In 2013, the Kansas Supreme Court held that extraordinary circumstances 
occurred in another case involving a same-sex couple.200  The facts reveal that 
two adult women began a relationship in 1995 and eventually one of the women 
gave birth to two children through artificial insemination—one in 2002 and 
another in 2004.  Each time a child was born, the two women executed a written 
coparenting agreement stating that the nonbiological partner was: 
a de facto parent and specified that her “relationship with the children 
should be protected and promoted”; that the parties intended “to 
jointly and equally share parental responsibility”; that each of the 
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 198. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 500–01 (N.Y. 2016). 
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parties “shall pay the same percent of [child] support as her net income 
compares to [their] combined net incomes”; “that all major decisions 
affecting [the] children . . . shall be made jointly by both parties”; and 
that in the event of a separation “the person who has actual physical 
custody w[ould] take all steps necessary to maximize the other’s 
visitation” with the children.201 
Eventually, in 2008, the couple separated and six months afterwards the birth 
mother began restricting the nonparent’s visitation with the children, prompting 
the nonparent to petition the court for enforcement of the coparenting 
agreement.202  The district court held that the agreement was enforceable and 
awarded the two former partners joint custody of the children,203 prompting an 
appeal by the birth mother.  Relying on Troxel and its argument supporting the 
fundamental right of a parent over a child, the birth mother rejected any 
enforcement of the coparenting agreement.  But the state’s highest court 
disagreed with the birth mother.  The Kansas Supreme Court relied upon the 
extraordinary circumstances occasioned by the biological parent’s action, first 
by executing the coparenting agreement, then in permitting the parent-child 
relationship to develop between the children and the nonparent, and the refusal 
by the parent to permit visitation with the former partner in 2008.204 
The court held that the agreement between the two partners regarding the 
children was enforceable and did not violate public policy.  Rather, “where two 
fit parents knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their parental 
preference by entering into a custody agreement with a third party that is in the 
best interests of the child, the court will enforce the agreement rather than second 
guess the parents’ decision.”205  Troxel does not bar such an agreement.  Instead, 
Troxel supports the right of a parent to shift parental status to a nonparent: “[A] 
parent should have the right to enter into a coparenting agreement to share 
custody with another without having the government interfere by nullifying that 
agreement, so long as it is in the best interests of the children.”206 
Coparenting agreements are subject to the best interests of the child.  Any 
coparenting agreement may benefit from a court’s conclusion that a fit parent 
                                                          
 201. Id. at 546 (alteration in original). 
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 203. Id. at 547. 
 204. Id. at 546. 
 205. Id. at 556; see also In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 304–06 (Ohio 2011) (noting a valid 
agreement relinquishing parental rights is enforceable); Grossman, supra note 143, at 713 (“A valid 
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 206. Frazier, 295 P.3d at 557 (alteration in original).  The court remanded the decision so that 
an appropriate custody and visitation schedule may be established.  Id. at 558; see also Boseman v. 
Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 504–05 (N.C. 2010) (holding that a parent may create a new family unit); 
Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000) (holding that a biological parent may, by signing 
an agreement, render that parent’s rights less exclusive). 
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knows what is in the best interest of his or her child; courts are more likely to 
accept agreements that include a rational plan for the child’s future.207 
iv.  Presumptive Parentage 
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA or “the Act”) was first promulgated in 
1973, revised in 2000, and further amended in 2002.  “The adoption of the UPA 
and similar statutes finalized a shift away from reliance on marital status as a 
proxy for biological fatherhood and towards recognition, and protection, of both 
burgeoning and full-fledged father-child relationships.”208  The UPA reflected 
what was occurring throughout the United States, that is, that single persons and 
functional families were having children outside the confines of marriage and 
that these children deserved to share in financial support, care, comfort, and 
support of functional unmarried parents.209  In addition, putative fathers had a 
right to the care and custody of their children.  Constitutional decisions ratified 
both the rights of children and fathers.210 
Prior to 2002, presumptions of paternity arose primarily in the context of 
marriage, but the 2002 version of the Act provides for presumptive paternity 
upon marriage and, in addition, refined the provision that a man may be 
presumed to be a parent of a child if, “for the first two years of the child’s life, 
he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as 
his own.”211  The 1973 provision contained a similar presumptive parentage 
provision but provided no time frame for residing with the child, only a “holding 
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at 560. 
 210. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (holding that unwed fathers 
were parents because of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (holding that illegitimate children are persons within the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled to the protection of the 
Constitution). 
 211. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see also Partanen v. 
Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016) (applying the presumption of parenthood to a woman in 
a nonmarital same-sex relationship). 
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out” provision.  The American Law Institute (ALI) uses a similar two-year time 
frame when there is an absence of a parenting agreement, but the person had a 
“good-faith belief that he was the child’s biological father, based on marriage or 
on the actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental 
responsibilities consistent with that belief.”212  In addition, the ALI permits a 
person to achieve parental status through coparenting agreements.213 
Judicial decisions have made it clear that the presumption of parentage is not 
restricted to men (putative fathers), but can include women too.  In a decision 
by the Kansas Supreme Court, the court used the state’s version of the UPA to 
justify awarding parental status to a female nonparent.  In interpreting the 
provisions of the statute, the court wrote, 
A harmonious reading of all of the [statute’s] provisions indicates that 
a female can make a colorable claim to being a presumptive mother of 
a child without claiming to be the biological or adoptive mother, and, 
therefore, can be an “interested party” who is authorized to bring an 
action to establish the existence of a mother and child relationship.214 
Other state courts have interpreted their own state parentage statues and 
arrived at similar conclusions.215  For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
permitted a same-sex partner, who was not a party to her partner’s adoption of a 
child from Russia, to achieve parental status in a custody dispute.216  The state’s 
appellate court rejected the nonparent’s claim as contrary to the fundamental 
rights of a parent to raise his or her child.  But the state’s highest court reviewed 
what courts in other states had decided and held that the nonparent qualified as 
a presumptive parent under the state’s statute.  Clear and convincing evidence 
of this was established because both parties were in a “committed relationship 
from 1993 to 2008”; both parties traveled together “to Russia to adopt [the] 
[c]hild during that relationship in 2000”; the nonparent “openly held the [c]hild 
out to the world as her daughter ever since [the] [c]hild arrived in New Mexico 
from Russia”; the child believes that the nonparent is her parent; the child lived 
with both the adoptive mother and the nonparent in “the same house from May 
2000 through August 2008”; and the nonparent “provided financial and 
                                                          
 212. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.03(1)(b)(ii)(A) (AM. LAW INST. 2002). 
 213. Id. at § 2.03(b)(iii)–(iv). 
 214. Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 553 (Kan. 2013) (alteration in original). 
 215. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a 
mother’s former lesbian partner may be a presumptive parent under the UPA when she received 
the child into the home she shared with her partner and openly held the child out as her own child); 
see also Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 695 (Cal. 2005); Frazier, 295 P.3d at 558; Partanen 
v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2016); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 
502 (N.H. 2014); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 285–86 (N.M. 2012). 
 216. Chatterjee, 280 P.3d at 301; see also Shineovich v. Kempt, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2009) (holding that the presumption of parenthood applying to a spouse can apply to a same-
sex domestic partner). 
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emotional support to both [the adoptive parent] and [the] [c]hild throughout this 
time period.”217 
b.  Psychological Parent: In Loco Parentis 
As discussed in the previous section examining extraordinary circumstances, 
the court’s decision depends upon clear and convincing facts justifying a third 
party being awarded parental status.  These facts may include a child’s 
detrimental reliance, a voluntary transfer of parental authority over a child to a 
nonparent, an express parenting agreement, or fulfilling the requirements for 
achieving the statutory presumption of parentage.  These factors may be more 
concrete than achieving parental status by being in loco parentis to a child, or by 
gradually becoming a psychological parent to a child.  When courts utilize the 
concept of de facto parenthood—that is, they do so through common law and 
not by statute—they may rely on more subjective factors.  Nonetheless, proof 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and the objective remains 
the best interest of the child.218  Establishing parental status in this fashion may 
be nebulous, but as Professor Katharine Bartlett observed, there is a gut feeling 
that the decision, one way or the other, is correct.219 
Whenever a parent is unwilling or unable to care for a child, and 
concomitantly, a nonparent assumes responsibility for the care of that child for 
a period of time, this nonparent can be said to be serving “in loco parentis” to 
the child, which means serving in place of the parent.  This status of in loco 
parentis has been codified by some states, with statutes providing objective 
standards by which to determine in loco parentis.220  But most often it is the 
courts that fashion in loco parentis.221  Traditionally, a nonparent serving in loco 
                                                          
 217. Chatterjee, 280 P.3d at 296 (alteration in original); see also Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670 
(holding that a person not related to the child through biology or adoption may be a presumed parent 
under the state’s parentage act); see also Partanen, 59 N.E.3d at 1141–43 (holding that a woman 
in a same-sex nonmarital relationship was a presumed parent to the children her partner gave birth 
to during their relationship and that she raised together with her partner); Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 
696 (holding that the state’s parentage act permits a person of the same sex to become a presumed 
parent to a child of his or her partner if the nonparent takes the child into his or her home and treats 
the child as his or her own). 
 218. See, e.g., Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016) (“The best interests of the 
child standard has been ‘firmly entrenched in Maryland and is deemed to be of transcendent 
importance.’  With this holding we fortify the best interests standard by allowing judicial 
consideration of the benefits a child gains when there is consistency in the child’s close, nurturing 
relationships.”). 
 219. Bartlett, supra note 115, at 66–67 (citing McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 2010)). 
 220. See, e.g., TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANN. § 102.003(9) (West 2015) (“[A] person, other than 
a foster parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months 
ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Welton v. Westmoreland, 180 So. 3d 738, 740, 745 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) 
(noting that the mother’s child resided with her stepfather for twelve years, took his name, and 
thought that she was his biological child, and now stepfather has in loco parentis and parenthood 
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parentis is not afforded all of the rights of a biological parent when there is a 
custody dispute over the child.  This is illustrated in the holding of one court: 
“In such instances the parents have a prima facie right to custody which will be 
forfeited only if convincing reasons appear that the child’s best interest[s] will 
be served by an award to a third party.”222 
Often in loco parentis status is achieved through conduct that occurs when a 
third party becomes what may be termed a psychological parent or an equitable 
parent.  It is difficult to define a psychological parent.223  Often, the term is 
similar to what others may define as an equitable parent, defined in Corpus Juris 
Secundum “as one who through judicial determination is able to exercise all the 
rights and responsibilities of a natural parent.”224  Likewise, a West Virginia 
decision defines a psychological parent as occurring whenever 
a child has resided with an individual other than a parent for a 
significant period of time such that the non-parent with whom the child 
resides serves as the child’s psychological parent, during a period 
when the natural parent had the right to maintain continuing 
substantial contact with the child and failed to do so, the equitable 
rights of the child must be considered in connection with any decision 
that would alter the child’s custody.225 
Regardless of what term is used, parental status rests upon the premise that it 
clearly and convincingly serves the best interests of the child.226 
To illustrate the equitable underpinnings of the doctrine of in loco parentis, 
consider the following: 
[A] husband, who is not the biological father of a child born or 
conceived during a marriage, may be considered the natural father of 
that child where the husband and child mutually acknowledge a 
relationship as father and child, or the mother of the child has 
                                                          
status); In re L.F.A., 220 P.3d 391, 392, 394 (Mont. 2009) (holding that a finding of unfitness was 
not necessary when the former partner of a biological parent with whom she had lived with for 
twelve years sought custody as a parent); McDonel v. Sohn, 762 A.2d 1101, 1108–09 (Pa. 2000) 
(noting that the aunt and uncle of child with whom the child had stayed in contact were 
psychological parents). 
 222. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 477–78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (quoting Charles v. 
Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255, 1258 (2000)). 
 223. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 167 n.7 (2005).  The court notes that “in 
loco parentis” “is temporary by definition and ceases on withdrawal of consent by the legal parent 
or parents,” thereby providing no parental status.  Id.  The court states that a “psychological parent” 
refers to “a parent-like relationship which is based . . . on day-to-day interaction” and may result in 
parental rights vis-à-vis third parties but not parents.  Id.   The court also determines that a “de facto 
parent” means “an individual who, in all respects functions as a child’s actual parent.”  Id. 
 224. 67A C.J.S. PARENT AND CHILD § 366 (West 2016) (referencing Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 
677 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. 2004)). 
 225. In re Interest of Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515, 523–24 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that the 
grandmother may pursue petition for custody as a psychological parent). 
 226. See, e.g., In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 147 (W. Va. 2005) (citing W. VA. CODE § 
48-9-103 (2001)). 
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cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a period of 
time prior to the filing of a complaint for divorce; the husband desires 
to have the rights afforded to a parent; and the husband is willing to 
take on the responsibility of paying child support.227 
Then, once a court accepts the status as an equitable parent, that party “becomes 
endowed with both the rights and responsibilities of a parent, there is no 
distinction at that point between an equitable parent and any other parent, and 
each is endowed with the same rights and responsibilities of parenthood.”228 
Any nonparent may establish himself or herself as an equitable parent, not just 
husbands.  Perhaps because the status arises as a result of judicial action, 
different names have arisen.  Some states use the term equitable parent, others 
psychological parent, others de facto parenthood. Some states may use all three 
terms interchangeably.  Perhaps de facto parenthood is the most defined of the 
three, but caution is advised in interpreting the terms.  Describing various states’ 
adoption of de facto parenthood, Professor Katharine Bartlett illustrates the 
interchangeability of the terms, writing that “[s]ince 2000, courts in Alaska, New 
Jersey, North Dakota, and South Carolina have recognized the similar concept 
of psychological parent.  Pennsylvania and Arkansas have adopted the concept 
of in loco parentis in coparent situations.”229 
At least prior to the adoption of same-sex marriage, an increasing number of 
courts were willing to provide the status of parent to nonparents who met the 
criteria of being a psychological parent.230  One decision from the West Virginia 
Supreme Court defined a psychological parent as the following: 
A psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day 
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, 
fulfills a child’s psychological and physical needs for a parent and 
provides for the child’s emotional and financial support.  The 
psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster parent, 
or any other person.  The resulting relationship between the 
psychological parent and the child must be of substantial, not 
                                                          
 227. 67A C.J.S. PARENT AND CHILD § 366 (emphasis added) (referencing York v. Morofsky, 
571 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2002) (permitting parentage when there is a holding out as a parent for the first two 
years of a child’s life). 
 228. 67A C.J.S. PARENT AND CHILD § 366. 
 229. Bartlett, supra note 115, at 61. 
 230. See Courtney Grant Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital) Child Behind, 48 FAM. L.Q. 495, 
510 (2014) (“While the early equitable parenting cases provided only limited protections, the trend 
has been in favor of granting greater protections to people who qualify as equitable parents.  More 
and more states allow equitable parents to seek not just visitation, but also custody.  In addition, it 
is increasingly the case under common law doctrine and statutory provisions that once a person 
establishes her status as an equitable parent, custody is allocated between the equitable parent and 
the legal parent under application of the best-interest-of-the-child standard.  This is based on the 
conclusion (a correct one, in my opinion) that equitable parents and legal parents are 
indistinguishable from the perspective of the child.”). 
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temporary, duration and must have been with the consent and 
encouragement of the child’s legal parent or guardian. . . . [W]e hold 
that in exceptional cases and subject to the court’s discretion, a 
psychological parent may intervene in a custody proceeding brought 
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) when 
such intervention is likely to serve the best interests of the children 
whose custody is under adjudication.231 
An early, but nonetheless widely-discussed illustration of psychological 
parenthood, Guardianship of Phillip B.,232 involved a boy born with Down 
Syndrome.  At birth, his parents immediately institutionalized him based on the 
recommendation of a social worker and the approval of the infant’s 
pediatrician.233  The boy’s name was Phillip and the institution where Phillip 
was placed was a licensed board and care facility for children up to eight years-
of-age.  It offered no structured educational or developmental programs, yet 
Phillip remained there for the first six years of his life, whereupon his parents 
transferred him to another facility that similarly offered no programs of 
education or therapy.234  Throughout Phillip’s residency at both institutions his 
parents visited him infrequently and became increasingly emotionally detached 
from him.235  As a result, “[t]he natural parents intellectualized their decision to 
treat Phillip differently from their other children.  [The parents] testified that 
Phillip, whom they felt would always require institutionalization, should not be 
permitted to form close emotional attachments which—upon inevitable 
disruption—would traumatize the youngster.”236 
At the second facility where Phillip was institutionalized, Phillip came into 
contact with a volunteer who had a history of working with children with special 
needs.  She, her husband, and their two children began to form a special 
attachment with Phillip.  When they first met Phillip he was “unusually small 
and thin for his age (five); he was not toilet trained and wore diapers, still slept 
in a crib, walked like a toddler, and crawled down stairs only inches high.  His 
speech was limited and mostly unintelligible; his teeth were in poor 
condition.”237  Gradually, the volunteer and her husband and their children 
worked with Phillip to enhance his ability to communicate, feed and dress 
                                                          
 231. In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157–58 (W. Va. 2005).  For illustrations of when the 
court held that no psychological parent status resulted, see In re Senturi N.S.V., 652 S.E.2d 490, 
493 (W. Va. 2007) (holding that the husband and the husband’s cousin were not psychological 
parents because they neither resided with nor had daily interaction with the child); Jensen v. 
Brevard, 168 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the grandmother was not a 
psychological parent when child lived with her only three days a week). 
 232. 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). 
 233. Id. at 785.  See generally Robert H. Mnookin, The Guardianship of Phillip B.: Jay Spears’ 
Achievement, 40 STAN. L. REV. 841 (1988). 
 234. Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 785. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 787 (alteration in original). 
 237. Id. at 786. 
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himself, and to engage in recreational activities.  Eventually Phillip spent an 
increasing amount of time at the home of the volunteer, living in a family setting, 
attending special Boy Scout meetings, and sharing household chores.238  
Nonetheless, throughout this period Phillip’s parents continued to remain 
physically and emotionally detached from their son.  By 1978, when Phillip was 
twelve-years-old, Phillip’s biological parents forbade their son from visiting the 
home of the volunteer or having personal visits at the facility with the volunteer.  
As a result of their decision Phillip became angry and began to demonstrate 
symptoms of emotional disturbance, such as bed-wetting, setting fires, and 
violence.239  Phillip “continuously pleaded to return home with [the 
volunteer].”240 
By 1981, when Phillip was fifteen-years-old, the biological parents were 
successful in obtaining consent to remove Phillip from the facility and to place 
him in another suitable alternative.  But no alternative could be found, thus 
continuing the stalemate between the biological parents and the volunteer 
family.  Eventually the nonparent volunteer petitioned to be appointed as 
guardian over Phillip, which the biological parents opposed.  At trial the court 
“expressly found that an award of custody to [the parents] would be harmful to 
Phillip in light of the psychological or ‘de facto’ parental relationship established 
between him and respondents.”241  Upon appeal the appellate court stressed the 
fundamental rights of parents to retain custody of a child, which may be 
disturbed only in extreme circumstances; such as a parent acting in a way 
inconsistent with being a parent.242  The issue became whether the parents acted 
in such a manner so as to rebut the parental presumption and permit a nonparent 
to level the playing field and prompt a best interest test.  The court held that the 
conduct of the parents did rise to the level of an extreme circumstance with their 
“calculated decision to remain emotionally and physically detached—abdicating 
the conventional role of competent decisionmaker in times of demonstrated 
need—thus effectively depriving [Phillip] of any of the substantial benefits of a 
true parental relationship.”243  Thus, the court held that “emotional 
abandonment” by a parent is sufficient to rebut a parent’s fundamental right to 
custody of a child.244 
                                                          
 238. Id. at 786–87. 
 239. Id. at 788. 
 240. Id. (alteration in original). 
 241. Id. at 789. 
 242. Id. at 788. 
 243. Id. at 792.  “Phillip’s conduct unmistakably demonstrated that he derived none of the 
emotional benefits attending a close parental relationship largely as a result of appellants’ 
individualized decision to abandon that traditional supporting role.”  Id. at 791. 
 244. Id. at 792. 
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The Phillip B. decision provides an opportunity to consider the status of 
psychological parent in rebutting the parental presumption.245  The trial court 
had found that “an award of custody to [the parents] would be harmful to Phillip 
in light of the psychological or ‘de facto’ parental relationship established 
between him and [the volunteers].”246  The temptation is to focus solely on the 
actions of nonparents in establishing close emotional ties with the children of 
others, becoming “de facto parents” to these children.247  Importantly, the Phillip 
B. decision focuses on two elements.  First, the “emotional abandonment” of the 
parents, and second, the interaction with the child by the nonparents that then 
permitted the nonparents to establish a psychological connection with the child.  
Upon appeal, the appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly found 
clear and convincing evidence that the parents themselves had performed 
detrimental acts toward their child.248  The most obvious act was the emotional 
abandonment of Phillip, but the court also considered other factors, such as the 
refusal of the parents to consent to surgery to remedy a medical condition 
suffered by Phillip.  According to the appellate court, “the trial court could have 
reasonably concluded that [the parents’] past conduct reflected a dangerously 
passive approach to Phillip’s future medical needs.”249  The parents acquiesced 
in the long-term relationship between their son and the nonparents, which 
resulted in a psychological relationship of parent and child. 
More than ten years after Phillip B. was decided, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court decided a case, which adopted the status of psychological parents to order 
visitation rights for a third party. The facts involved a same-sex couple in which 
the partner of a biological parent sought custody and visitation rights to the 
biological parent’s child.250  The two women, Sandra and Elsbeth, “shared a 
close, committed relationship for more than ten years.”251  They mutually agreed 
                                                          
 245. For additional discussion see, for example, In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W. Va. 
2005) (“[W]e hold that a psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, 
through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child’s psychological and 
physical needs for a parent and provides for the child’s emotional and financial support.”). 
 246. Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (alteration in original).  See generally GOLDSTEIN, FREUD 
& SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) (describing the status of 
psychological parents). 
 247. See, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1179 (Me. 2014) (“[A] court contemplating an 
order that creates a parent out of a non-parent must first determine that the child’s life would be 
substantially and negatively affected if the person who has undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, 
committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life is removed from that role.”); see also 
Samuel Johnson, Comment, Are You My Mother? A Critique of the Requirements for De Facto 
Parenthood in Maine Following the Law Court’s Decision in Pitts v. Moore, 67 ME. L. REV. 353 
(2015). 
 248. Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 790; see also Guardianship of Jenna G., 74 Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (reaffirming the necessity of providing clear and convincing evidence to rebut 
the parental presumption in a custody dispute between a parent and a nonparent). 
 249. Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 792. 
 250. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 420–21 (Wis. 1995). 
 251. Id. at 421. 
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to have a child together and as a result of this agreement, Elsbeth gave birth to a 
baby in 1988 with the assistance of artificial insemination.  The two women 
jointly selected a name for the child, were named as the child’s parents during a 
dedication ceremony at their church, and shared responsibility for raising the 
child.252  In 1993, the couple separated, Elsbeth taking the child with her.  By 
1994, when the child was six-years-old, Elsbeth, the biological parent, informed 
her former partner, Sandra, that she would no longer allow her contact with the 
child.253  Sandra subsequently filed a petition for custody of the child, and then 
filed a petition for visitation.  A guardian ad litem was appointed for the child, 
who reported the following to the circuit court: 
The child stated that he believed [Sandra] was his parent and that he 
would like to see, spend time with and telephone [Sandra].  He was 
able to recite [Sandra’s] new address and telephone number.  The child 
acknowledged that his mother [Elsbeth] no longer viewed [Sandra] as 
his parent, that she would be upset if he continued to see [Sandra], but 
that he wanted to see her anyway.  He stated that he did not consider 
anyone other than [Sandra] and [Elsbeth] to be his parents.254 
The lower court dismissed Sandra’s petition for custody and visitation, but 
urged the legislature to reexamine the law in light of the realities of modern 
society and the need to protect a child against the trauma that a child suffers 
when a child forms a bond with a biological parent’s nontraditional partner and 
that adult relationship then dissolves.255  Following the lower court’s decision, 
Sandra appealed directly to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
The state’s highest court agreed with the lower court that the nonparent, 
Sandra, had not proven the biological parent’s unfitness with clear and 
convincing evidence and hence she had not rebutted the parental presumption.256  
Such a holding rests firmly on the traditional rights of a parent as expressed in 
the Troxel decision.  The court then reviewed the state’s overall statutory policy 
affecting visitation with a child and concluded that, “[i]t is reasonable to infer 
that the legislature did not intend the visitation statutes to bar the courts from 
exercising their equitable power to order visitation in circumstances not included 
within the statutes but in conformity with the policy directions set forth in the 
statutes.”257  Such a pronouncement appears to contradict the 2000 holding of 
Troxel, which was decided after this 1995 Wisconsin decision.  In 2000 the 
Court in Troxel held, 
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 255. Id. at 422–23. 
 256. Id. at 424. 
 257. Id. at 431.  For another illustration of a court’s willingness to utilize equity unless 
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2005) (holding that a nonparent was a de facto parent because of equitable considerations). 
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[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children . . . there 
will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private 
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make 
the best decision concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.258 
But concomitantly, the Troxel court also held, that “we do not consider the 
primary constitutional question . . . whether the Due Process Clause requires all 
nonparent visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to 
the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation.”259 
Thus, viewed in the context of Troxel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not 
ignore the constitutional rights of the biological parent.260  The Wisconsin court 
permited a nonparent to petition for visitation with the child when the parent 
permitted the child to develop a relationship with the nonparent, and in so doing 
established a psychological bond between the child and the nonparent.  The court 
held: 
Mindful of preserving a biological or adoptive parent’s 
constitutionally protected interest and the best interest of the child, we 
conclude that a circuit court has equitable power to hear a petition for 
visitation when it determines that the petitioner has a parent-like 
relationship with the child and that a significant triggering event 
justifies state intervention in the child’s relationship with a biological 
or adoptive parent.  To meet these two requirements, a petitioner must 
prove the component elements of each one. Only after the petitioner 
satisfies this burden may a circuit court consider whether visitation is 
in the best interest of the child.”261 
Similar to the holding of the West Virginia Supreme Court in its decision of 
In re Clifford K.,262 the Wisconsin Supreme Court established specific 
delineating elements of a psychological relationship sufficient to create a 
parental status.  It held that any petitioner must prove four elements: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, 
the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived 
together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed 
                                                          
 258. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061 (2000). 
 259. Id. at 2064.  The harm triggering state intervention in the decision of In re Custody of 
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(Wis. 1995). 
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obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the 
child’s care, education and development, including contributing 
towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial 
compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role 
for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a 
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.263 
Furthermore, there must be a significant triggering event to justify a state’s 
interference with the parent-child relationship, prompting the petition for 
parental status, such as “[t]he petitioner must prove that the parent has interfered 
substantially with the petitioner’s parent-like relationship with the child, and that 
the petitioner sought court ordered visitation within a reasonable time after the 
parent’s interference.”264 
While recognizing the groundbreaking effect of the Wisconsin decision, 
commentators also criticized the limited applicability of the decision.  The 
decision pertained only to visitation petitions, not custody cases.265  Nonetheless, 
commentators report that an increasing number of states adopted the rationale of 
the decision and applied this rationale to both visitation and custody matters.266  
Yet, at the same time, other commentators report that a few states continue to 
reject the court’s rationale.267  Likewise, reminiscent of the protracted litigation 
concerns elucidated by Debra H., “[c]ourts also cite the lack of certainty about 
parental status as a reason to reject de facto parentage, and the lack of statutory 
authority to create a quasi-parental status not obviously provided for by the 
legislature.”268  Nonetheless, as other court opinions illustrate, “certainty may 
come at the expense of the welfare of children who sometimes develop strong 
relationships with adults who do not fit the clearly demarcated role of ‘legal 
                                                          
 263. Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435–36.  The importance of the first prong of the 
test, the parent’s consent to the establishment of the relationship, is emphasized in a decision of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court.  See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the 
parent must willingly create and foster the bond between the child and the nonparent, and adopting 
the test of In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. to establish a psychological parent status).  Once a person 
becomes a psychological parent that person “stands in parity with the legal parent” and any custody 
of visitation issues between them must be determined on a best interest of the child standard.  Id. 
at 554. 
 264. Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 436. 
 265. Joslin, supra note 230, at 499–500; see also Bartlett, supra note 115, at 57 (noting that 
the Wisconsin decision was a “significant exception” to a preexisting pattern of rejecting nonparent 
visitation petitions). 
 266. Joslin, supra note 230, at 500–01. 
 267. Grossman, supra note 143, at 679 (“Their chief concern is intruding on the rights of the 
biological mother, in violation of her constitutionally protected parental rights.”). 
 268. Id. at 679–80.  The author references, for example, Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 810 
(Utah 2007) (“We decline to extend the common law doctrine of in loco parentis to create standing 
where it does not arise out of statute.”).  See also Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 51 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-101 (West 2016). 
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parent.’. . . This latter consequence is especially troubling given the law’s 
commitment, in the custody context, to continuity of care for children.”269 
Many courts utilize equitable factors to permit nonparents to obtain parental 
rights pertaining to children with whom they have been involved for a long 
period of time.270  For example, in 2005, the Washington Supreme Court utilized 
common law to establish parental status, writing that 
Washington courts have consistently invoked their equity powers and 
common law responsibility to respond to the needs of children and 
families in the face of changing realities.  We have often done so in 
spite of legislative enactments that may have spoken to the area of law, 
but did so incompletely.271 
The court held that without specific legislative prohibition, the court is free to 
use common law to arrive at the controlling interest in such cases, this being the 
best interest of the child.272  But the court was careful to avoid prohibitions 
established by Troxel, so it utilized the four objective factors established by the 
Wisconsin court to established parenthood.273 Once the four factors have been 
established, the Washington Supreme Court held that, “henceforth in 
Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal 
parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise.”274  These rights include a 
duty to support the child, the right to be named on a child’s birth certificate, and 
the right to inherit through intestate succession.275 
                                                          
 269. Grossman, supra note 143, at 685. 
 270. Bartlett, supra note 115, at 66 (specifying that few states refuse to recognize some form 
of de facto parenthood); Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian 
Couples and Their Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 208 (2014) (stating that only a 
minority of states refuse some recognition of legal parenthood for functional partners); Conover v. 
Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 449–50 n.21 (Md. 2016) (providing a list of states evidencing a modern 
trend towards the recognition of the status of de facto parentage). 
 271. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 166 (Wash. 2005); see also C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 
A.2d 1146, 1150–51 (Me. 2004) (holding that a nonparent could have parental rights as an 
undefined de facto parent); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 2001) (granting parental rights 
to a nonparent because she had “assumed a parental status and discharged parental duties with the 
consent of the biological parent”); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 975 (R.I. 2000) (holding that 
certain circumstances could result in a nonparent being awarded parental rights over a child); 
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999) (holding that the court has equity power to 
grant visitation to a nonparent when that nonparent has participated in the child’s life). 
 272. Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 172–73. 
 273. Id. at 176.  Subsequently, the Washington Supreme Court held that there were no 
categorical exclusions when petitioning as a de facto parent.  See In re Custody of A.F.J., 314 P.3d 
373, 374 (Wash. 2013); In re Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 472 (Wash. 2013). 
 274. Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 177.  But note that stepparents may not become de facto 
parents.  See In re Parentage of M.F., 228 P.3d 1270, 1273–74 (Wash. 2010).  A court then held 
that a stepparent has a statutory remedy when seeking custody of a stepchild.  Id. at 1273. 
 275. Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 180 n.2 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Shondel J. v. 
Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 2006) (stating that the best interest of the child will result in 
the inability of a nonparent to cease support payments); Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that two biological parents and one person standing in loco parentis 
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In 2016 the highest court in Maryland likewise employed the four-part test 
enunciated in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.276 and reversed its holding in Janice 
M. v. Margaret K.,277 a 2008 decision rejecting de facto parenthood.278  In its 
2016 decision the Maryland high court held that the state’s adoption of same-
sex marriage in 2012 signaled greater acceptance of same-sex relationships.279  
Furthermore, the majority of states have moved towards recognition of a status 
identified as de facto parentage or a similar status, such as psychological parent, 
in loco parentis, or when there were extraordinary circumstances.280  Based on a 
national trend, and in the absence of any contrary legislative pronouncements, 
the court held that “de facto parenthood is a viable means to establish standing 
to contest custody or visitation” without the necessity of proving the unfitness 
of the child’s parent.281  As the court did in Wisconsin and other states, the 
Maryland court held that for de facto parent status to apply “the legal parent 
must consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the child; 
the third party must have lived with the child; the third party must perform 
parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most important, a 
parent-child bond must be forged.”282  The court held that the “third-party 
seeking de facto parent status bears the burden of proving” these factors.283 
Furthermore, seeking to meet the test of Troxel, the court held, 
The de facto parent doctrine does not contravene the principle that 
legal parents have a fundamental right to direct and govern the care, 
custody, and control of their children because a legal parent does not 
                                                          
to child all had child support obligations for child); L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 878 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2002) (holding that a former opposite-sex unmarried partner stood in loco parentis to the 
children she bore and had a duty to provide financial support for them). 
 276. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
 277. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008); see also Toni S. Boettcher, Same-
Sex Couples and Custody and Visitation, 45 MD. B.J. 48, 49 (2012) (“In the past decade, the number 
of same-sex couples residing in Maryland has increased by 51%, and more than 25% of those 
couples are raising children, according to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau.”). 
 278. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016).  In Conover, two lesbians began a 
relationship in 2002 and one of them gave birth to a boy in 2010 through artificial insemination.  
Id. at 434.  The couple validly married after the birth of the child, but then separated and divorced 
in 2012.  Id.  Following the divorce, the birth mother refused visitation to her former spouse and 
that spouse filed a claim seeking visitation rights.  Id. 
 279. Id. at 448. 
 280. Id. at 450. 
 281. Id. at 35; see also Bartlett, supra note 115, 64–65 (“More often, standing itself is limited 
to persons who have a residential, caregiving relationship with the child.  Some states single out 
particular categories of individuals, like grandparents, stepparents, or siblings, as individuals who 
can seek specified visitation or custody rights, but since Troxel, these special standing statutes, too, 
require that the relative has lived with the child, sometimes for a particular length of time, or can 
show that the child’s parents are unfit or unavailable.”). 
 282. Id. at 37 (quoting V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 223 (2000)). 
 283. Id. at 44. 
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have a right to voluntarily cultivate their child’s parental-type 
relationship with a third party and then seek to extinguish it.284 
Unlike the more subjective approaches establishing parental status in 
nonparents, such as extraordinary circumstances or psychological parents, the 
identifiable factors adopted in Wisconsin’s decision of In re Custody of H.S.H.-
K., and in other states including Maryland, offer an objective standard of de facto 
parentage.  The objective factors differ from judicial approaches because they 
offer the certainty sought by the New York court in Debra H., yet at the same 
time do not require functional families to conform to the requirements of 
marriage.  A review of the factors indicates that functional families may easily 
slip into conformity with the factors, providing an element of objectivity and 
continuity in a child’s life. 
c.  De Facto Parent by Statute 
Heretofore, the term de facto parent has been used most often in the context 
of common law—a court reviewing the facts and determining that a parent has 
permitted a nonparent to assume the role of a parent as a de facto parent.  But 
there are statutory formulations of de facto, legal, and estoppel parenthood.  The 
ALI statutorily defines a parent as someone who is a legal parent, a parent by 
estoppel, or a de facto parent.285  Most common is a legal parent, someone who 
                                                          
 284. Id. at 45 (“The H.S.H.-K. standard for determining de facto parenthood is therefore 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation in Troxel.”). 
 285. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.03(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2002).  The statute defines parent as follows: 
Unless otherwise specified, a parent is either a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, or a de 
facto parent: 
(a) A legal parent is an individual who is defined as a parent under other state law. 
(b) A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, 
(i) is obligated to pay child support under Chapter 3; or 
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and 
(A) over that period had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was the child’s 
biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or 
representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent 
with that belief, and 
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to make 
reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child’s father; or 
(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with 
the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child 
together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that 
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or 
(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s 
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that 
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests. 
(c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel 
who, for a significant period of time not less than two years, 
(i) lived with the child and, 
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is defined as such under applicable state law.286  A parent by estoppel is someone 
who does not meet the definition of a parent under state law, but is obligated to 
pay child support or has lived with the child for at least two years and had a 
reasonable good-faith belief that he or she was a parent of the child.287  In 
addition, a parent by estoppel may have a coparenting agreement with the child’s 
legal parent to accept full and permanent responsibility for the child, or finally, 
had an agreement with the parent to accept full and permanent responsibility for 
the child and the court finds that it is in the best interest of the child to enforce 
the agreement.288  Comments to the ALI provision state that a parent by estoppel 
focuses “on function, rather than on detrimental reliance,”  and overall, “a parent 
by estoppel is an individual who, even though not a legal parent, has acted as a 
parent under certain specified circumstances which serve to estop the legal 
parent from denying the individual’s status as a parent.”289  The Comments also 
specify that the status of parent by estoppel only applies when “the court 
determines that the status is in the child’s best interests.”290  If a person qualifies 
as a parent by estoppel, the ALI comments specify that he or she 
is afforded all of the privileges of a legal parent under this Chapter, 
including standing to bring an action and the right to have notice of 
and participate in an action brought by another under § 2.04, the 
benefit of the presumptive allocation of custodial time provided for in 
§ 2.08(1)(a), the advantage of the presumption in favor of a joint 
allocation of decisionmaking responsibility afforded by § 2.09(2), the 
right of access to school and health records specified in § 2.09(4), and 
                                                          
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement 
of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure 
or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, 
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) 
regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the 
parent with whom the child primarily lived. 
Id. 
 286. Id. § 2.03(1)(a). 
 287. Id. § 2.03(1)(b).  Comments suggest that good faith belief may result from a number of 
factors, such as marriage to the mother of the child, or sexual intercourse with the mother at the 
approximate time of conception.  See id. § 203 cmt. (b)(ii). 
 288. Id. § 203(1)(b)(i)–(iv).  The comment to Section 203 states: 
A formal, written agreement is not required to create a parent-by-estoppel status under 
Paragraph (1)(b)(iii), but the absence of formalities may also affect the factfinder’s 
determination of whether an agreement was made. The factfinder must determine 
whether, given the circumstances, the actions of the individual seeking status as parent 
and those of the legal parent or parents are sufficiently clear and unambiguous to indicate 
that a parent status was understood by all of them. 
Id. § 203 cmt. (b)(iii). 
 289. Id. § 203 cmt. (b). 
 290. Id. § 203 cmt. (b)(iii). 
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priority over a de facto parent and a nonparent in the allocation of 
primary custodial responsibility under § 2.18.291 
The ALI creates a third statutory status, a de facto parent.  A de facto parent 
is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a 
significant period of time, not less than two years, lived with the child 
throughout this period of time for reasons other than financial compensation, 
regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child or 
regularly performed a share of the caretaking functions at least as great as that 
of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.292  In addition, the de facto 
parent must assume these caretaking responsibilities293 as a result of an 
agreement with the legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result 
of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking 
functions.294  Apparently, the distinction between a parent by estoppel and a de 
facto parent is that the latter never had a good faith belief that he or she was a 
parent of the child.295 Once a de facto status is obtained, the ALI section 2.18 
                                                          
 291. Id. § 203 cmt. (b). 
 292. Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(i)–(ii). 
 293. Id. § 2.03(5).  The statute provides what constitutes caretaking: 
Caretaking functions are tasks that involve interaction with the child or that direct, 
arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by others.  Caretaking functions 
include but are not limited to all of the following: 
(a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing the child’s bedtime and wake-
up routines, caring for the child when sick or injured, being attentive to the child’s 
personal hygiene needs including washing, grooming, and dressing, playing with the 
child and arranging for recreation, protecting the child’s physical safety, and providing 
transportation; 
(b) directing the child’s various developmental needs, including the acquisition of motor 
and language skills, toilet training, self-confidence, and maturation; 
(c) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners, assigning and supervising chores, 
and performing other tasks that attend to the child’s needs for behavioral control and self-
restraint; 
(d) arranging for the child’s education, including remedial or special services appropriate 
to the child’s needs and interests, communicating with teachers and counselors, and 
supervising homework; 
(e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal relationships with 
peers, siblings, and other family members; 
(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-up, and home health care; 
(g) providing moral and ethical guidance; 
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, babysitter, or other child-care provider 
or facility, including investigation of alternatives, communication with providers, and 
supervision of care. 
Id. 
 294. Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii). 
 295. See id. § 2.03 cmt. (b)(ii) (“The parent-by-estoppel definition is more strict, however, in 
requiring that the man have had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was the parent.  When this 
reasonable good faith exists, the individual is seeking status based not solely on his functioning as 
a parent, but on the combination of the parental functions performed and the expectations of the 
parties.  As is the case with a de facto parent, the necessary indications of a commitment to the 
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gives “preference to legal parents and parents by estoppel, and it precludes an 
allocation of responsibility to adults other than the parents except in a narrow 
range of cases.”296  The ALI explains the priority it gives to legal parents and 
parents by estoppel over a de facto parent as resulting from “the societal 
consensus that responsibility for children ordinarily should be retained by a 
child’s parents, while recognizing that there are some exceptional circumstances 
in which the child’s needs are best served by continuity of care by other 
adults.”297 
The ALI’s definition of de facto parenthood is a statutory one, but some state 
courts have used the term de facto parent in crafting an equitable remedy called 
by the same term.298  For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in a 2006 
decision, defined a de facto parent as follows: 
[O]ne who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated 
in the child’s life as a member of the child’s family.  The de facto 
parent resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement 
                                                          
child must have existed for a period of at least two years, assuring that the commitment is serious, 
long-term, and significant.”). 
 296. Id. § 2.18.  The Section allocates parental responsibility as follows: 
(1) The court should allocate responsibility to a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, or a 
de facto parent as defined in § 2.03, in accordance with the same standards set forth in 
§§ 2.08 through 2.12 except that 
(a) it should not allocate the majority of custodial responsibility to a de facto parent 
over the objection of a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who is fit and willing to 
assume the majority of custodial responsibility unless 
(i) the legal parent or parent by estoppel has not been performing a reasonable 
share of parenting functions, as defined in § 2.03(6), or 
(ii) the available alternatives would cause harm to the child; and 
(b) it should limit or deny an allocation otherwise to be made if, in light of the number 
of other individuals to be allocated responsibility, the allocation would be impractical 
in light of the objectives of this Chapter. 
(2) A court should not allocate responsibility to an individual who is not a legal parent, a 
parent by estoppel, or a de facto parent, over a parent’s objection, if that parent is fit and 
willing to care for the child, unless any of the following circumstances exist: 
(a) the individual is a grandparent or other relative who has developed a significant 
relationship with the child and 
(i) the parent objecting to the allocation has not been performing a reasonable 
share of parenting functions for the child; and 
(ii) if there is another legal parent or parent by estoppel, that parent is unable or 
unwilling to care for the child, or consents to the allocation; 
(b) the individual is a biological parent of the child who is not the child’s legal parent 
but who has an agreement with a legal parent under which the individual retained 
some parental rights or responsibilities; 
(c) the available alternatives would cause harm to the child. 
Id. 
 297. Id. § 2.18 cmt. (a). 
 298. For an illustration of various state statutes utilizing de facto parentage, see Jeffrey A. 
Parness, Troxel Revisited: A New Approach to Third-Party Childcare, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 
227, 232–37 (2015).  For a judicial construct using the same term, see, for example, Conover v. 
Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 446–53 (Md. 2016). 
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of the legal parent, performs a share of the caretaking functions at least 
as great as the legal parent.299 
The Massachusetts court ruled that the status of de facto parenthood resulted 
from “the Probate and Family Court’s general equity powers . . . to protect the 
welfare of minors.”300  The court recognized that its own perception of de facto 
parent was influenced by the statutory formulation of the ALI,301 holding that 
the focus on “caretaking in the ALI Principles is one means by which to anchor 
the best interests of the child analysis in an objectively reasonable assessment of 
whether disruption of the adult-child relationship is potentially harmful to the 
child’s best interests.”302 
Comments to the ALI state that “requirements for becoming a de facto parent 
are strict, to avoid unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion into the relationships 
between legal parents and their child.”303  Please note that there is a two-year 
living together time frame in the ALI provision, which the Comments suggest 
means spending the night in the same residence.  In addition to this two-year 
commitment, the child and the putative de facto parent must have resided with 
the child within six-months prior to commencing an action to be named as a de 
facto parent.304  The ALI reasons, 
This additional standing requirement is justified by the fact that the 
status of a de facto parent is based on an individual’s functioning as a 
parent, and it is assumed that the importance of this role diminishes as 
the period of functioning as a parent becomes more remote in time.305 
Other states have adopted the status of de facto parent through state 
legislation.  For example, Indiana defines the status as a custodian “who has 
been the primary caregiver for, and financial support of, a child who has resided 
with the person for at least (1) six (6) months if the child is less than three (3) 
years of age; or (2) one (1) year if the child is at least three (3) years of age.”306  
In 2014, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a stepfather to a child born prior 
to his marriage to the child’s mother qualified as a de facto parent when he and 
                                                          
 299. A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1070 (Mass. 2006) (holding that biological mother’s 
partner’s relationship with the child did not rise to the level of a de facto parent). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 1071. 
 302. Id. (citing PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(B) (AM. LAW INST. 2002)). 
 303. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 
cmt. (c) (AM. LAW INST. 2002). 
 304. See id. § 2.04(1)(c). 
 305. Id. § 2.03 cmt. (c)(iv). 
 306. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2007) (“Any period after a child custody proceeding 
has been commenced may not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the 
person for the required minimum period.”). 
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the child lived together in the same household from the time the child was three 
until the child was seven.307 
In 2009, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to recognize the standing of a 
lesbian partner of a child’s adoptive mother, seeking custody of the child as a de 
facto parent.  The court refused to use common law to supplant the absence of 
legislative enactment of de facto parenthood.308  As a result of this 2009 decision 
the legislature enacted an amendment to the state’s UPA, which provided for the 
status of de facto parentage in Delaware, which was then applied retroactively 
to the litigants in the 2009 case.309  Nonetheless, that statute was held to be 
unconstitutional because “[e]xtending the sacred right of parenthood to more 
than two people dilutes the constitutional rights of the two parents.”310  
Specifically, the Delaware Family Court held that the state’s enacted de facto 
parentage statute is unconstitutional because it is “overbroad and violates the 
due process rights of the parents under the Constitution of the United States and 
also under the Constitution of the State of Delaware.”311 
Seeking to rectify the statute’s infirmity, the Delaware legislature amended 
the state’s parentage act,312 permitting the statutory amendment to apply 
retroactively to the litigants in the 2009 decision.  Hence, in 2011 the Delaware 
Supreme Court revisited the state’s statutory policy of de facto parental status 
and ruled that the most recent version of the statute was constitutional and may 
be applied to the original litigants.313  The decision involved two lesbians, one 
of whom had adopted a child but her partner did not.  When their relationship 
ended the adoptive parent terminated any contact between the child and the 
                                                          
 307. See Fry v. Fry, 8 N.E.3d 209, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).  Under Indiana law the stepfather 
would be allowed to file for custody independently.  Id. at 216 n.1 (“Indiana Code section 21-17-
2-3(2) . . . . provides that any person ‘other than a parent’ may seek custody of a child by initiating 
an independent cause of action for custody that is not ancillary to a dissolution, legal separation, or 
child support action, subject to the law governing third party-natural parent custody disputes.”).  
For analysis, see Amy E. Higdon & Emily J. Barry, Recent Developments in Indiana Family Law, 
48 IND. L. REV. 1297, 1323 (2015). 
 308. See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 9–10 (Del. 2009). 
 309. See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 924 (Del. 2011). 
 310. Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010). 
 311. Id. 
 312. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2010).  The Code states: 
(c) De facto parent status is established if the Family Court Determines that the de facto 
parent: 
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who fostered the 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de 
facto parent; 
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is defined in § 1101 
of this title; and 
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a 
bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature. 
Id. 
 313. Smith, 16 A.3d at 923–24. 
2016] Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families 419 
former partner and the partner petitioned the court for custody and visitation 
with the child.  As a result of the legislature’s amendment to the statute, the 
categories of parents with standing to seek custody were enlarged to include de 
facto parents.314  Because the nonparent became a parent by reason of the new 
legislation, there was no conflict with Troxel, since that decision involved a 
parent and nonparents seeking visitation.315 
Litigation between the contesting adopting parent and the nonparent 
continued from 2004 until the decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2011.  
Sadly, lengthy and contentious litigation is often associated with these cases and 
the court acknowledged this in its decision: “We empathize with both parties in 
having to continue the process of litigating who has custody of [the child].  We 
also are sensitive to the emotional considerations and frustrations that both 
parties have experienced throughout this process.”316  But the court then 
concluded that it is within the prerogatives of the legislature to establish the 
definition of parent in the state, a definition that may now include de facto 
parents.317  Providing the statutory formula offers objectivity, suggesting 
speedier resolution of future cases. 
The ALI’s statutory approach to de facto parenthood continues to be the 
subject of commentary.  Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson argued that the “ALI’s 
thinned out test for parenthood overrides the judgments of mothers without 
sufficient consideration for the risks to children.”318  But Professor Katharine T. 
Bartlett concluded that the treatment of “de facto parents in the ALI Principles 
combines the approach taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in H.S.H.-K., 
allowing third-party claims to functional parents in certain limited 
circumstances, with the kind of limits on third-party visitation contemplated in 
Troxel.”319  Professor Bartlett noted that the ALI’s de facto parenting approach 
does the following: (1) relies on past caretaking practices, (2) the qualifications 
involve very specific and rigorous criteria, (3) grandparents and other relatives 
have no special priority, (4) a fit parent will still have custodial care priority over 
a de facto parent unless that fit parent has not been performing a reasonable share 
of the parenting functions or unless available alternatives would harm the child, 
(5) a de facto parent may have preference over a relative of the child, and (6) a 
de facto parent may be allotted visitation with the child.320 
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 318. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Limiting the Prerogatives of Legal Parents: Judicial Skepticism 
of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW., 
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Jersey and Washington.  See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551–52 (N.J. 2000); In re Parentage of 
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 320. Bartlett, supra note 115, at 59–60. 
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As testament to the value of the certainty provided by the ALI’s statutory 
formulation, Professor Bartlett writes, 
Since the ALI began publishing Tentative Drafts of the Principles, the 
law in an increasing number of states has evolved in the direction that 
the Principles recommend.  Various state courts, including courts in 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Washington, Maine, Rhode Island . . . 
have recognized de facto parenthood under certain circumstances, as 
had a few state statutes even earlier.321 
In addition, Professor Bartlett concluded that the past caretaking activity that the 
ALI requires offers a “reasonably determinate and child-centered corrective” to 
the subjectivity that permeates child custody decisions,322  and that “[p]ast 
caretaking history is the factor with the strongest societal consensus about the 
best interests of children, and the factor that will also produce the greatest 
consistency.”323 
III.  THE IMPACT OF OBERGEFELL: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
A. Judicial Achievement 
Having discussed the various equitable and statutory parentage remedies that 
have arisen in the last sixty years, it is pertinent to ask if the availability of same-
sex marriage will affect them, specifically extraordinary circumstances, 
psychological parentage, or de facto parentage. Arguably, because the 
presumptive parentage of marriage was previously unavailable to same-sex 
couples, these equitable and statutory remedies provided same-sex persons 
parentage status sufficient to overcome the prohibitive holding of Troxel.  These 
remedies provided status when states prohibited them from entering into 
marriage.  But are they needed now?  Since same-sex couples may marry, can 
courts and legislatures be more demanding and require the bright line of 
marriage and the traditional parentage presumptions associated with it?  Would 
the elimination of alternative means of establishing parentage minimize 
litigation, promote better protection of a child’s best interests, and require those 
who seek state intervention to complete the necessary formalities of marriage? 
The impact of same-sex marriage in the United States is undetermined.  But, 
the momentous events precipitating the 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on June 26, 2015, are chronicled and testify to the vigilance of 
those who made it happen.  The decision rested upon previous decisions of the 
Supreme Court and many federal and state courts.  One author observed that the 
decision in Obergefell occurred on the twelfth anniversary, to the day, of 
                                                          
 321. Id. at 61–62.  Maryland may be added to that list of state courts.  See Conover v. Conover, 
146 A.3d 433, 451–53 (Md. 2016). 
 322. Bartlett, supra note 115, at 67. 
 323. Id. 
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Lawrence v. Texas324 and the second anniversary of United States v. Windsor,325 
both notable and precipitous decisions.326  These two decisions were particularly 
instrumental in what would become the Court’s consensus on same-sex 
marriage.  But other decisions of the Court contributed to the holding in 
Obergefell.  Surely the right to privacy, announced in 1965 in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,327 and then privacy’s application to individuals and not just married 
couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird328 in 1972, were essential.  Likewise, when the 
Court held that the definition of marriage could include persons of different races 
in Loving v. Virginia329 in 1967, the evolving definition of marriage rationale 
could proceed so that marriage could evolve to be defined as including persons 
of the same sex.330  Then, in 1996, when the Court held in Romer v. Evans331 
that a state constitutional amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it practiced invidious discrimination against 
persons because of sexual orientation, it marked a change in perspective.  The 
Romer decision signaled that the Court would interpret the Constitution to 
protect not only racial minorities, but sexual orientation minorities too.  This 
change in perspective would find further expression in the 2013 decision of 
United States v. Windsor,332 holding that the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) was unconstitutional because it violated the guarantee of equal liberty 
of persons under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.333  Simply 
stated, if any state permitted same-sex marriage, why should any same-sex 
married couple in that state be denied federal benefits if these benefits were 
provided to opposite-sex couples in that state?  Clearly, these two couples were 
being denied equality of treatment in that state as it pertained to federal benefits.  
There was a shift in judicial perspective among the states, which contributed to 
                                                          
 324. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (holding that the liberty interest of adults under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects voluntary intimate conduct). 
 325. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (“Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional as a 
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 328. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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 332. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 333. Id. 2695–96. 
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the Court’s holding mandating that same-sex marriage be permitted in all the 
states.334 
There had been an evolving shift in social perception too.  According to 
commentary on the issue, “the biggest reason behind the shift in public opinion 
was that the sixty-year civil rights struggle of homophiles, gays and lesbians, 
and the LGBT community had not been for naught.”335  The media had made 
the public aware of the horror of AIDS, discriminatory treatment of persons with 
AIDS, their long-time partners, and the tragedy of parents witnessing their 
sons—and soon to be daughters—dying of a disease that targeted the 
marginalized with disproportionate vengeance.336  On May 12, 2012, Vice 
President Biden appeared on the popular NBC program Meet the Press.  The 
host, David Gregory, asked the Vice President what he thought of gay marriage 
and the Vice President replied that for him, it came down to “who you love” and 
he was fine with it.337  Compare this with the 2004 State of the Union address of 
President George W. Bush when he called for a constitutional amendment to 
define marriage as one man and one woman.338  But then, when on the campaign 
trail running against John Kerry, Bob Schieffer of CBS news asked President 
Bush: “Do you believe homosexuality is a choice?”  “I just don’t know,” said 
the President, “I do know that we have a choice to make in America, and that it 
is to treat people with tolerance and respect and dignity.”339 
Toleration had made it possible for LGBT persons to “come out of the closet” 
and Americans were discovering that their neighbors or their neighbors’ children 
were gay or lesbian.340  For the first time, television viewers witnessed persons 
of the same sex displaying affection in popular television shows such as Will 
and Grace or Glee.  In 2012, Vice President Biden, when asked why he favored 
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 335. FADERMAN, supra note 326, at 613 (2015). 
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 339. Id. at 410–11. 
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2016] Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families 423 
same-sex marriage, replied that “‘things begin to change when social culture 
changes’—Will and Grace was his example.”341  Specifically, Biden stated that 
Will and Grace “probably did more to educate the American public [about gay 
people] than almost anything anybody’s done so far.”342 
It came as no surprise that Associate Justice Kennedy would deliver the 
Court’s opinion in Obergefell.  He had been appointed to the Court by President 
Reagan in 1988, two years after the Court had decided Bowers v. Hardwick.343  
In that decision, the Court held that the Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit the Court to declare that 
homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy.344  The opinion 
stated, 
There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive 
reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the 
category of rights deemed to be fundamental.  Otherwise, the Judiciary 
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country 
without express constitutional authority.  The claimed right pressed on 
us today falls far short of overcoming this resistance.345 
Explicitly, the Court’s decision permitted states with statutes criminalizing 
sodomy to prosecute same-sex persons engaging in sexual acts defined as 
such.346  Implicitly, because the Court’s factual context involved persons of the 
same sex, it had a chilling effect on the constitutional rights of same-sex 
persons.347 
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 343. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 344. Id. at 194–95. 
[T]o claim that a right to engage in such conduct is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
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 346. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (“We . . . are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 
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statute challenged in Bowers provides: 
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual 
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . . . 
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GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). 
 347. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (“Although Bowers was 
eventually repudiated in Lawrence, men and women were harmed in the interim, and the substantial 
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There was a strong dissent in Bowers from Justices Blackmun, Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens.  Justice Blackmun wrote that the Constitution gave 
“individuals the right to decide for themselves whether to engage in particular 
forms of private, consensual sexual activity.”348  Furthermore, Justice Stevens 
wrote, 
Although the meaning of the principle that “all men are created equal” 
is not always clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen has the 
same interest in ‘liberty’ that the members of the majority share.  From 
the standpoint of the individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual 
have the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, 
more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and 
voluntary associations with his companions.  State intrusion into the 
private conduct of either is equally burdensome.349 
Eventually, in 2003, Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas,350 which overruled the Court’s holding in Bowers.  The facts 
in Lawrence also involved a state sodomy statute and two persons of the same 
sex arrested for violating that statute.351  The Texas statute provided that “[a] 
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another individual of the same sex.”352  The statute defines “[d]eviate sexual 
intercourse” as follows: “(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one 
person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the 
genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”353  However, unlike 
Bowers, the majority opinion in Lawrence, written by Justice Kennedy, not only 
overruled Bowers, but provided recognition and support for intimate conduct 
associated with same-sex relationships. 354  In Lawrence, the Court recognized 
that the activity criminalized involved 
two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged 
in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners 
are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot demean 
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime.  Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause 
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gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government.355 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Lawrence resonated in Obergefell twelve years 
later.  Obergefell involved fourteen same-sex couples, and two men whose 
same-sex partners were deceased at the time of the petition, who challenged the 
laws in four states that refused to issue them marriage licenses.356  The couples 
argued that the refusal was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment357 because 
“[u]nder the Due Process Clause . . . no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”358  The Court held that the 
guarantee of liberty extended to “certain personal choices central to individual 
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal dignity 
and beliefs.”359  By defining liberty in such a manner, the Court identified with 
the individualism essential to functional families, the sense of privacy 
announced in Griswold and Eisenstadt, and then applied these factors to a choice 
to marry.  The Court concluded that, “the right to marry is a fundamental right 
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may 
not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”360  And with that holding, the 
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Court went beyond traditional rights deeply rooted in the country’s history and 
compelled public state-government approval of same-sex relationships.361 
The importance of marriage is a reoccurring theme throughout the Court’s 
decision in Obergefell.  The following quotes illustrate this societal and 
historical importance: 
 “Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.”362 
 Quoting from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Court 
elevated marriage, writing that “it fulfils [sic] yearnings for security, 
safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil 
marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and 
whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”363 
 “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might 
call out only to find no one there.  It offers hope of companionship 
and understanding and assurance that while both still live there will 
be someone to care for the other.”364 
 “Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to 
children’s best interests.”365 
 “[M]arriage is a keystone of our social order.”366 
 Perhaps most resoundingly, the Supreme Court stated, 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest 
ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.  In forming a 
marital union, two people become something greater than once they 
were. . . . [M]arriage embodies a love that may endure even past death.  
It would misunderstand these [plaintiffs] to say they disrespect the 
idea of marriage.  Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so 
deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves.  Their hope 
is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of 
civilizations oldest institutions.367 
The majority opinion in Obergefell was delivered by Justice Kennedy, in 
which Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.368  There were 
four separate dissents issued by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, 
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Thomas, and Alito; some of the Justices joined in the dissents of others.369  None 
of the dissents question the unique and fundamental role of marriage, but rather, 
the means by which the majority arrived at the decision, particularly the 
majority’s willingness to change the definition of marriage to include same-sex 
persons, a departure not included in its fundamental nature.  The constitutional 
underpinnings of the decision are beyond the scope of this Article.  However, 
the brief history and scope of the decision is provided to illustrate that marriage 
is distinctively important; it has and does provide economic and public benefits.  
Today, after Obergefell, it is incorrect to suggest that it is an irrelevant option to 
consider when same-sex couples have children together.  As Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote in his dissent in Obergefell, “[c]elebrate the achievement of a 
desired goal.  Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to 
a partner.  Celebrate the availability of new benefits.  But do not celebrate the 
Constitution.  It had nothing do to with it.”370  Constitutional scholars will 
continue to discuss if the Constitution had anything to do with the Court’s 
decision, but the fact remains that same-sex couples can marry.  What are the 
consequences for functional families? 
B.  Consequences of Marriage 
Incidents of family law have, for the most part, been reserved to the states and 
the Court in Obergefell acknowledged this fact, stating that “while the States are 
in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, they have 
throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of 
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”371  The Court then listed 
certain categories of rights pertinent to married couples, thereby providing 
general parameters of what is available to spouses: 
[T]axation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate 
succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access, 
medical decision making authority; adoption rights; the rights and 
benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics 
rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; 
health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules.372 
Additionally, “[v]alid marriage under state law is also a significant status for 
over a thousand provisions of federal law.”373 
Based on the protracted litigation precipitating the guarantee of same-sex 
marriage, it is reasonable to presume that, in addition to the social and historical 
benefits associated with marriage, the economic and parental benefits would 
incentivize same-sex couples to marry.  Specifically, economic support 
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obligations would provide greater financial security for persons in a valid 
marriage.  Additionally, and pertinent to this Article, the facilitation of 
establishing parental status would provide an objective and accelerated means 
of avoiding the hurdles of Troxel.  This Article will briefly describe both. 
1.  Economic Benefits 
The majority opinion in Obergefell, like many other courts ruling on the 
entitlement of same-sex couples to the status of marriage, held that marriage 
conferred “privileges and responsibilities.”374  Because the state is a party to any 
marriage375 there are enforceable responsibilities that do not consistently 
complement nonmarital partnerships.  Among these responsibilities is the 
obligation of a spouse to provide for the necessities of the other throughout the 
course of their marriage.376  While the doctrine of necessaries arose at common 
law, some states codified it.377  If a married couple petitions to bring about a 
legal separation, one of the spouses may be required to provide maintenance to 
the other until such time as a final decree of divorce is issued by an appropriate 
court.378  Then, following a final decree of divorce, a court may divide the 
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custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home. 
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marital property accumulated by the parties during marriage.379  In addition, the 
court may impose an obligation to pay alimony—spousal support—for a limited 
period of time, or possibly, until the recipient spouse dies or remarries.  In a 
common law state, the amount and length of the award will depend on equitable 
factors.380  In a community property state, the courts may use similar factors to 
                                                          
(2) The maintenance order must be in amounts and for periods of time that the court 
considers just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant 
facts, including: 
 (a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital 
property apportioned to that party, and the party’s ability to meet the party’s needs 
independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living 
with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian; 
 (b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party 
seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; 
 (c) the standard of living established during the marriage; 
 (d) the duration of the marriage; 
 (e) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking 
maintenance; and 
 (f) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet the spouse’s 
own needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. 
Id. 
 379. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (2005).  This section provides: 
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal separation, or division of property 
following a decree of dissolution of marriage or legal separation by a court that lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to divide the property, 
the court, without regard to marital misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal 
separation may, finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets 
belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired and whether the title to the 
property and assets is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In making 
apportionment, the court shall consider the duration of the marriage and prior marriage 
of either party, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, 
vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, 
custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to 
maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and 
income. The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of value of the 
respective estates and the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit. 
In dividing property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, bequest, 
devise, or descent, property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the 
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, the 
increased value of property acquired prior to marriage, and property acquired by a spouse 
after a decree of legal separation, the court shall consider those contributions of the other 
spouse to the marriage, including: 
 (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker; 
 (b) the extent to which the contributions have facilitated the maintenance of the 
property; and 
 (c) whether or not the property division serves as an alternative to maintenance 
arrangements. 
Id. 
 380. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319(A)–(B) (2016).  The Arizona statute states: 
A. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or a proceeding for 
maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court that lacked personal 
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determine what is just and reasonable.381  Or the court may divide the community 
between the two spouses. 
                                                          
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order for either 
spouse for any of the following reasons if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: 
 1. Lacks sufficient property, including property apportioned to the spouse, to provide 
for that spouse’s reasonable needs. 
 2. Is unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate employment or is the custodian 
of a child whose age or condition is such that the custodian should not be required to 
seek employment outside the home or lacks earning ability in the labor market 
adequate to be self-sufficient. 
 3. Contributed to the educational opportunities of the other spouse. 
 4. Had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may preclude the possibility 
of gaining employment adequate to be self-sufficient. 
B. The maintenance order shall be in an amount and for a period of time as the court 
deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant 
factors, including: 
 1. The standard of living established during the marriage. 
 2. The duration of the marriage. 
 3. The age, employment history, earning ability and physical and emotional 
condition of the spouse seeking maintenance. 
 4. The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet that spouse’s 
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. 
 5. The comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative 
earning abilities in the labor market. 
 6. The contribution of the spouse seeking maintenance to the earning ability of the 
other spouse. 
 7. The extent to which the spouse seeking maintenance has reduced that spouse’s 
income or career opportunities for the benefit of the other spouse. 
 8. The ability of both parties after the dissolution to contribute to the future 
educational costs of their mutual children. 
 9. The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital 
property apportioned to that spouse, and that spouse’s ability to meet that spouse’s 
own needs independently. 
 10. The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party 
seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment and whether such education or 
training is readily available. 
 11. Excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent 
disposition of community, joint tenancy and other property held in common. 
 12. The cost for the spouse who is seeking maintenance to obtain health insurance 
and the reduction in the cost of health insurance for the spouse from whom 
maintenance is sought if the spouse from whom maintenance is sought is able to 
convert family health insurance to employee health insurance after the marriage is 
dissolved. 
 13. All actual damages and judgments from conduct that results in criminal 
conviction of either spouse in which the other spouse or child was the victim. 
Id. 
 381. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4330(a) (West 2016).  California law provides the following: 
(a) In a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, the court 
may order a party to pay for the support of the other party an amount, for a period of 
time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living 
established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances as provided 
in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 4320). 
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In the event that a spouse should die during an intact valid marriage, the 
surviving spouse is entitled to a plethora of benefits: Social Security 
entitlements, preference for pension benefits under the Employee Retirement 
Security Act of 1974, homestead protection against creditors,382 family 
maintenance during the time it takes to administer the decedent spouse’s 
estate,383 a personal property exemption from the claims of creditors,384 and 
every state provides a mechanism by which a surviving spouse may claim at 
least a portion of any assets passing to a third party at the death of the decedent 
spouse without the consent of the surviving spouse.385 
It seems apparent that the financial security offered by a valid marriage is 
substantial.  As this brief summary illustrates, a spouse may have necessities 
paid during a viable marriage, maintenance provided upon a legal separation, 
support following the dissolution of the marriage, and division of any 
accumulated marital property.  In the event of death, a surviving spouse has 
preference for any pension benefits administered by ERISA, a host of state 
protections against encroachment by creditors, then intestate benefits, a forced 
elective share against a spouse’s estate, Social Security or ERISA benefits, and 
priority status when making decisions concerning the estate.  And just as there 
are financial benefits during marriage and after divorce, the potential for 
financial security after death is significant. 
2.  Parentage Benefits 
An additional benefit of marriage arises in tandem with the UPA, enacted in 
one form or another in many of the states.  The UPA, as has been discussed, 
supra, establishes presumptions of parentage when otherwise a child could be 
considered nonmarital.386  Undoubtedly, the UPA’s emphasis on marriage 
facilitates parentage, and while it is does not address all potential situations, 
especially in regards to assisted reproduction, it addresses a significant portion 
of the factual scenarios relating to same-sex couples.  Revisions have been made 
ostensibly to protect functional families.  The UPA is meant to assist putative 
parents, men and women, seeking to establish parentage in the context of 
                                                          
Id. 
 382. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (providing that under the homestead protection, Florida 
allows up to one-half of an acre in a municipality and 160 acres elsewhere). 
 383. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/15-1(a) (West 2010) (allowing an amount 
“suited to the condition in life of the surviving spouse and to the condition of the estate”). 
 384. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-403 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (providing a $15,000 
exemption). 
 385. This process of “election” replaces ancient doctrines of dower and curtesy.  For a 
description of the process see Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s 
Elective Share, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617 (2010) (discussing the Uniform Probate Code’s elective 
share provision). 
 386. For a more complete discussion of the Act, see supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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functional families, often utilizing assisted reproductive technology.387  In 
addition, the UPA seeks to serve the best interests of children involved.  While 
not perfect, the UPA nonetheless offers persons, especially married persons, the 
easiest means by which to establish paternity or maternity.  Most of all, the UPA 
provides an objective standard, a bright line, thereby lessening the contentious 
and lengthy litigation process often associated with establishing parentage 
through common law methods. 
Even though the UPA provides that any child born to unmarried parents “has 
the same rights under the law as a child born to parents who are married to each 
other,”388 this does not address who qualifies as a parent of that child.  To address 
this, section 204 of the UPA creates presumptions of paternity and maternity 
because the section will be applied without gender restrictions.  Of the five 
presumptions provided in the statute, four involve marriage between the man 
and child’s mother, and only one provides another option: a presumption of 
paternity if “for the first two years of the child’s life, [the man] resided in the 
same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.”389  
Otherwise, paternity may be established through birth, adjudication, 
acknowledgement,390 or consent to assisted reproduction, which resulted in the 
birth of a child.391  Finally, surrogacy contracts or gestational agreements are 
valid in some states, and the UPA provides the parameters of what constitutes a 
valid gestational agreement, including when the agreement is authorized and the 
subsequent establishment of parentage.392 
                                                          
 387. See Grossman, supra note 143, at 701–02 (“The adoption of the UPA and similar statutes 
finalized a shift away from reliance on marital status as a proxy for biological fatherhood and 
towards recognition, and protection, of both burgeoning and full-fledged father-child 
relationships.”). 
 388. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see also UNIF. PROB. 
CODE § 2-117 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“[A] parent-child relationship exists between a child 
and the child’s genetic parents, regardless of the parents’ marital status.”). 
 389. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5). 
 390. See id. § 301 (“The mother of a child and a man claiming to be the genetic father of the 
child may sign an acknowledgement of paternity with intent to establish the man’s paternity.”).  In 
addition, the requirements for acknowledgement are extensive.  There must be a signed record by 
the man and the mother, no adjudicated father, determination of whether there is a presumed father 
and whether genetic testing was performed, and that the parties signing understand that 
acknowledgement is an adjudication of paternity and this must be challenged, if at all, within two 
years or be barred.  Id. § 302(a). 
 391. See id. §§ 201(b)(5), 704. 
 392. See id. §§ 801–809 (provisions on gestational agreements).  See generally Jillian Casey, 
Courtney Lee & Sartaz Singh, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 83, 
99 (2016) (providing that “states approach surrogacy contracts in different ways” when determining 
enforceability); Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1185, 1210–15 (2016) (explaining the California courts’ application of the intentional parenthood 
principle when deciding issues arising from gestational agreements and the extension of the 
principle to unmarried same-sex couples). 
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Presumptions established under the UPA are applicable unless rebutted by 
persons with standing393 and with sufficient evidence supported by genetic 
testing.394  Both standing and the submission of evidence are, to quote the 
comments of the UPA, “confused in the case law,”395 thereby qualifying 
marriage and adoption as the best ways by which to establish parenthood over a 
child.  Due to the formalities associated with each marriage and adoption, they 
offer objective bright-line rules facilitating parentage in comparison to the more 
subjective equitable formulations.396  Adoption by same-sex unmarried couples 
had become increasingly available among the various states.397  Stepparent 
adoption may be available to unmarried or married same-sex couples.  
                                                          
 393. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 602 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).  Section 602 provides: 
a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by: 
(1) the child; 
(2) the mother of the child; 
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated; 
(4) the support-enforcement agency [or other governmental agency authorized by other 
law]; 
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency; [or] 
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would otherwise be 
entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated, or a minor[; or] 
(7) in intended parent under [Article 8]. 
Id. 
 394. Id. at § 505.  Section 505 states, 
(a) Under this [Act], a man is rebuttably identified as the father of a child if the genetic 
testing complies with this [article] and the results disclose that: 
(1) the man has at least a 99 percent probability of paternity, using a prior probability 
of 0.50, as calculated by using the combined paternity index obtained in the testing; 
and 
(2) a combined paternity index of at least 100 to 1; 
(b) A man identified under subsection (a) as the father of the child may rebut the genetic 
testing results only by other genetic testing satisfying the requirements of this [article] 
which: 
(1) excludes the man as a genetic father of the child; or 
(2) identifies another man as the possible father of the child. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section 510, if more than one man is identified by 
genetic testing as the possible father of the child, the court shall order them to submit to 
further genetic testing to identify the genetic father.    
Id.  
 395. See id. at Prefatory Note.  The confusion results from different approaches taken among 
the states to whether the presumption may be rebutted, who has standing to rebut, and the type of 
evidence that may be introduced to form an effective rebuttal.  Id. 
 396. See generally Grossman, supra note 143, at 684–85 (explaining that considering the 
nature of custody hearings, it is not inconsistent for a statute governing child support to direct the 
court to consider equitable estoppel, while the statute governing parental custody is silent, and such 
difference is necessary to promote certainty; however, the different treatment unexpectedly resulted 
in the bright line rule). 
 397. See generally Nadia Stewart, Note, Adoption by Same-Sex Couples and the Use of the 
Representation Reinforcement Theory to Protect the Rights of Children, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 347, 357 (2011) (noting that California, Massachusetts, and Maine allow joint adoption by 
same-sex couples). 
434 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 66:363 
Stepparent adoption may occur whenever the spouse of a parent with custody of 
a child seeks to adopt a stepchild and both biological parents agree.  Like all 
adoptions, the process is statutory so the procedures established in each of the 
states must be satisfied.  To illustrate, the Uniform Adoption Act permits 
a stepparent . . . to adopt a minor stepchild who is the child of the 
stepparent’s spouse if: 
(1) the spouse has sole legal and physical custody of the 
child and the child has been in the physical custody of the 
spouse and the stepparent during the 60 days next 
proceeding the filing of the petition for adoption; 
(2) the spouse has joint legal custody of the child with the 
child’s other parent and the child has resided primarily with 
the spouse and the stepparent during the 12 months next 
preceding the filing of the petition; [or] 
(3) the spouse is deceased or mentally incompetent, but 
before dying or being judicially declared mentally 
incompetent, had legal and physical custody of the child, 
and the child has resided primarily with the stepparent 
during the 12 months next preceding the filing of the 
petition[.]398 
If a stepparent does not meet the conditions, for “good cause shown,” a court 
may nonetheless allow a petition to be filed to adopt the child.399  Finally, 
consent of the former spouse of the biological parent with custody of the child 
is required prior to adoption by the stepparent,400 but if consent is not obtained, 
the statute permits a petition to terminate that parent’s parental rights.401  
Obviously, consent by the spouse of the stepparent, the child’s biological parent, 
is required as well. 
An adopted child is a child of the adopting parents and entitled to all of the 
benefits associated with that status.  To illustrate, the Uniform Probate Code 
addresses the rights of that child to inherit.  The Code treats a stepparent adoption 
differently from other adoptions.  The Uniform Probate Code defines a “parent-
child relationship” as follows: 
A parent-child relationship exists between an individual who is 
adopted by the spouse of either genetic parent and: (1) the genetic 
parent whose spouse adopted the individual; and (2) the other genetic 
                                                          
 398. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102(a)(1)–(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
 399. Id. § 4-102(b). 
 400. Id. § 2-401(a)(1)–(3) (requiring consent by biological parents, guardian, and current 
adoptive parents); id. § 4-104 (requiring consent by the stepchild adoptee who is at least twelve-
years-old, the minor’s stepparents, guardian, and agency); id. § 4-105 (requiring consent by 
stepparent’s spouse); id. § 4-106 (requiring the form of consent to be in writing if the consent is 
from the minor’s parent that is not stepparent’s spouse); id. § 4-102(b) (requiring consent of 
custodial parent even if the stepparent does not have standing to adopt under Section 4-102(a)). 
 401. Id. § 4-102(c). 
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parent, but only for the purpose of the right of the adoptee or a 
descendant of the adoptee to inherit from or through the other genetic 
parent.402 
Thus, the Code permits a child adopted by the spouse of the child’s genetic 
parent to inherit from and through at least three persons: the two genetic parents 
and the adopting stepparent. Nonetheless, the inheritance right is only to benefit 
the child, the noncustodial parent whose consent was required may not inherit 
from or through that child.  The comment to Section 2-119(b) of the Code states 
the following: 
[A] parent-child relationship also continues to exist between an 
adopted stepchild and his or her other genetic parent (the noncustodial 
genetic parent) for purposes of inheritance from and through that 
genetic parent, but not for the purposes of inheritance by the other 
genetic parent and his or her relatives from or through the adopted 
stepchild.403 
When confronted with the possibility of contentious litigation concerning 
parental status of same-sex partners, courts often recommended that the same-
sex partner not genetically connected to the child adopt the child to preclude 
disputes.  Such an adoption would objectively establish parenthood even though 
there is no genetic connection.  In addition, the genetically connected partner 
does not relinquish his or her parental rights when the child is adopted by a 
partner.  For example, in Smith v. Gordon,404 the facts involved two women who 
traveled together to a foreign country to adopt a child.405  Local law prohibited 
both women from adopting, so only one adopted the child and all three returned 
to Delaware where they resided together in a common household.406  The 
adopting woman’s partner intended to adopt the child once back in the United 
States, but never did so.407  Eventually, the two women dissolved their 
relationship and the adopting parent, soon afterwards, refused to allow her 
former partner visitation with the child.408  Adoption, or marriage if it had been 
a possibility, would have precluded the extensive litigation that occurred 
between 2004 and 2011 as the nonparent petitioned for visitation with the 
                                                          
 402. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-119(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 403. Id. § 2-119 cmt. (b). 
 404. 968 A.2d 1 (Del. 2009). 
 405. Id. at 3. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id.; see also A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Mass. 2006) (partner “viewed the 
adoption [of the child] as a formality necessary only in the unlikely event of a ‘worst case 
scenario.’”). 
 408. Smith, 968 A.2d at 3. 
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child.409  Only when the Delaware legislature adopted de facto parentage did the 
litigation end.410 
Adoption can be expensive and involves administration and intensive scrutiny 
by state agencies organized to protect children from abuse and neglect.  
Marriage, on the other hand, is inexpensive, speedy, and in many circumstances 
establishes paternity of a child immediately.  For example, in the Smith case, 
two women were in a committed relationship when one of them adopted a child 
in a foreign country.411  If they had been married when the child was adopted the 
partner who was a stranger to the adoption would have been a parent by reason 
of a presumption in the UPA, which would reason that she is the presumed parent 
because she “and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child 
is born during the marriage.”412  This was the means of establishing parentage 
in Debra H. v. Janice R.413  Recall that in that decision, the highest court in New 
York held a valid same-sex civil union in Vermont counted as a marriage entitled 
to comity in New York.414  The nonbiological partner was married to the 
biological parent at the time she gave birth to the child, thus, it made the 
nonbiological spouse a parent of a child born after the civil union.415  Therefore, 
because the child in question was conceived after the civil union, a status 
comparable to marriage, the child was considered a child of both of the 
“married” partners.416  This remains a viable option in spite of more recent 
developments in New York law.417 
The Delaware decision of Smith v. Guest418 illustrates the value in bright line 
objectivity as compared to equitable models that are, according to a decision of 
New York’s highest court, “contentious, costly, and lengthy.”419  The 
establishment of parenthood litigation traps “single biological and adoptive 
parents and their children in a limbo of doubt.”420  The facts illustrate this.  For 
example, in Debra H., the couple met in 2002, one of the women had a child 
through artificial insemination in 2003, and they separated in 2006.  Then the 
mother prohibited her former partner from having contact with the child in 
                                                          
 409. Id. at 4. 
 410. See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 936 (Del. 2011) (providing that the legislature intended 
the newly enacted statutory language of de facto parentage to apply retroactively). 
 411. Smith, 968 A.2d at 3. 
 412. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 413. 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). 
 414. Id. at 196–97 
 415. Id. at 195. 
 416. Id. 
 417. See, e.g., Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 501–02 (N.Y. 2016) 
(abrogating Debra H. and holding that parenthood may be established through proof of more 
subjective criteria, such as clear and convincing evidence of a preconception agreement between 
the partners). 
 418. 16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2010). 
 419. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 192; Guest, 16 A.3d at 931. 
 420. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 193. 
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2008.421  Litigation commenced immediately, ending only in 2010, with the 
state’s highest court’s ruling.  Ten years had elapsed between birth of the child 
and a cessation of litigation.  Likewise, in Smith v. Guest, formerly Smith v. 
Gordon, two women met and formed a relationship in 1994.  One of the parties 
adopted a child in 2003 and then ended their relationship in 2004, followed by a 
refusal to allow visitation with the adopted child.422  The facts indicate that 
litigation did not cease until 2011 when the child was then eight-years-old.  
Similarly, in Alison D., another New York decision, a child was born to one of 
the partners in 1981 through artificial insemination and 26 months later the 
couple ended their relationship but began litigating over the status of the 
nonbiological partner.  That litigation ended in the highest court of New York in 
1991 when the court ruled that the biological mother’s former partner was not a 
parent.423  Again, ten years elapsed between birth of the child and the end of 
litigation, and eight years elapsed between when the couple separated and the 
end of litigation.  Even though the New York court reversed its holding in Alison 
D.,424 the facts illustrate the contentious nature of litigation surrounding the 
establishment of parenthood. 
C.  Will Marriage Make a Difference? 
Same-sex marriage is predicated upon the premise that same-sex couples 
should have equal access to the financial and status benefits of marriage 
identically with opposite-sex couples.  This premise is illustrated in the 1993 
decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in which same-sex couples petitioned the 
court to order the state to issue them a marriage license.  In its decision the court 
wrote the following: 
The applicant couples correctly contend that the DOH’s refusal to 
allow them to marry on the basis that they are members of the same 
sex deprives them of access to a multiplicity of rights and benefits that 
                                                          
 421. Id. at 186. 
 422. Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 3 (Del. 2009). 
 423. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29–30 (N.Y. 1991); see also A.H. v. M.P., 857 
N.E.2d 1061, 1065, 1073 (Mass. 2006) (noting that a child was born via artificial insemination in 
2001, the couple separated in 2003, and litigation ended in 2006 when Massachusetts’ highest court 
refused to find a common law de facto parentage status existed); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 
494, 497–98, 504–05 (N.C. 2010) (noting the baby was born to committed partners in 2002, the 
relationship ended in 2006, and the highest state court granted nonbiological person parental status 
in 2010); Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 435–38 (Md. 2016) (noting that the child was born 
via artificial insemination in 2010, the parties then separated in 2011, the biological parent stopped 
visitation in 2012, and the litigation eventually ended in 2016 when Maryland adopted common 
law de facto parenthood); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 164, 176 (Wash. 2005) (noting 
that a couple had a child in 1995, separated in 2001, and then litigation ended in 2005 when court 
adopted common law de facto parenthood); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 810, 819 (Utah 2007) 
(noting that a baby was born via artificial insemination to two women in 2001, the relationship 
ended in 2003, and litigation concerning nonbiological partner’s status ended in 2007 when Utah’s 
highest court refused to adopt common law de facto parentage). 
 424. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 500–02 (N.Y. 2016). 
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are contingent upon that status.  Although it is unnecessary in this 
opinion to engage in an encyclopedic recitation of all of them, a 
number of the most salient marital rights and benefits are worthy of 
note.  They include: (1) a variety of state income tax advantages, 
including deductions, credits, rates, exemptions, and estimates, under 
HRS . . . ; (2) public assistance from and exemptions relating to the 
Department of Human Services . . . ; (3) control, division, acquisition, 
and disposition of community property . . . ; (4) rights relating to 
dower, curtesy, and inheritance . . . ; (5) rights to notice, protection, 
benefits, and inheritance under the Uniform Probate Code . . . ; (6) 
award of child custody and support payments in divorce proceedings 
. . . ; (7) the right to spousal support . . . ; (8) the right to enter into 
premarital agreements . . . ; (9) the right to change of name . . . ; (10) 
the right to file a nonsupport action . . . ; (11) post-divorce rights 
relating to support and property division . . . ; (12) the benefit of the 
spousal privilege and confidential marital communications . . . ; (13) 
the benefit of the exemption of real property from attachment or 
execution . . . ; and (14) the right to bring a wrongful death action . . . 
.  For present purposes, it is not disputed that the applicant couples 
would be entitled to all of these marital rights and benefits, but for the 
fact that they are denied access to the state-conferred legal status of 
marriage.425 
Likewise, when same-sex couples sought marriage licenses in Vermont, the 
couples argued that 
in denying them access to a civil marriage license, the law effectively 
excludes them from a broad array of legal benefits and protections 
incident to the marital relation, including access to a spouse’s medical, 
life, and disability insurance, hospital visitation and other medical 
decisionmaking privileges, spousal support, intestate succession, 
homestead protections, and many other statutory protections.426 
The Vermont Supreme Court agreed in a 1999 decision, holding that the 
“Vermont Constitution would ensure that the law uniformly afforded every 
Vermonter its benefit, protection, and security so that social and political 
preeminence would reflect differences of capacity, disposition, and virtue, rather 
than governmental favor and privilege.”427  The court then enumerated the rights 
that marriage provides in the state: 
While the laws relating to marriage have undergone many changes 
during the last century, largely toward the goal of equalizing the status 
of husbands and wives, the benefits of marriage have not diminished 
in value.  On the contrary, the benefits and protections incident to a 
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marriage license under Vermont law have never been greater.  They 
include, for example, the right to receive a portion of the estate of a 
spouse who dies intestate and protection against disinheritance 
through elective share provisions . . . ; preference in being appointed 
as the personal representative of a spouse who dies intestate. . . ; the 
right to bring a lawsuit for the wrongful death of a spouse . . . ; the 
right to bring an action for loss of consortium . . . ; the right to workers’ 
compensation survivor benefits . . . ; the right to spousal benefits 
statutorily guaranteed to public employees, including health, life, 
disability, and accident insurance . . . ; the opportunity to be covered 
as a spouse under group life insurance policies issued to an employee 
. . . ; the opportunity to be covered as the insured’s spouse under an 
individual health insurance policy . . . ; the right to claim an 
evidentiary privilege for marital communications…; homestead rights 
and protections . . . ; the presumption of joint ownership of property 
and the concomitant right of survivorship . . . ; hospital visitation and 
other rights incident to the medical treatment of a family member . . . 
; and the right to receive, and the obligation to provide, spousal 
support, maintenance, and property division in the event of separation 
or divorce . . . .  Other courts and commentators have noted the 
collection of rights, powers, privileges, and responsibilities triggered 
by marriage.428 
Even though its decision would be reversed on appeal,429 in 2005 the New 
York Supreme Court held that same-sex couples had a right to marry as a result 
of the state constitution’s guarantee of equal protection and due process of 
laws.430  And as did previous courts, the New York court, in its opinion, 
acknowledged the extensive benefits and protections provided by marriage.  The 
court specified that 
[The state] does not dispute that plaintiffs and their children suffer 
serious burdens by being excluded from civil marriage.  Marriage 
provides an extensive legal structure that protects the couple and any 
children.  It is not disputed, for example, that among many other 
disadvantages, plaintiff couples may not own property by the 
entireties; file joint state income tax returns; obtain health insurance 
through a partner’s coverage; obtain joint liability or homeowner’s 
insurance; collect from a partner’s pension benefits; have one partner 
of the two-women couples be the legal parent of the other partner’s 
artificially inseminated child, without the expense of an adoption 
proceeding; invoke the spousal evidentiary privilege; recover damages 
for an injury to, or the wrongful death of, a partner; have the right to 
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make important medical decisions for a partner in emergencies; inherit 
from a deceased partner’s intestate estate; or determine a partner’s 
funeral and burial arrangements.  “Marriage laws provide many 
financial and legal protections to married couples.  The U.S. General 
Accounting Office has identified 1049 federal laws in which benefits, 
rights and privileges are contingent on marital status.”431 
In addition to benefits, there is added value in the status of marriage.  Justice 
Kennedy, in his majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, described marriage 
as “essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations,”432 and that for same-
sex couples, “their immutable nature dictates that . . . marriage is their own real 
path to this profound commitment.”433  Justice Kennedy further explained that 
children of same-sex couples, “[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and 
predictability marriage offers . . . suffer the stigma of knowing their families are 
somehow lesser.”434  These quotes testify to the inherent status of marriage as a 
conveyor of historical and cultural value. 
Finally, in the view of the litigants advocating in the courts and on the streets 
for marriage equality, the opportunity to marry may provide another aspect: 
affirmation.  Frank Kameny, an outspoken advocate for the gay and lesbian 
community, summarized what affirmation means.  In an eulogy he gave for a 
colleague, who died in 1997, he reflected on the progress of the gay and lesbian 
community: 
“We started with nothing, and look what we have wrought!” . . . 
recalling the dark decades when “the government was our enemy, and 
was out to get us—and they did”; then revealing that in the nineties 
almost a million lesbians and gays filled the Washington Mall; lesbian 
and gay federal employees came out at work and weren’t fired because 
there were laws protecting them; and the president and vice president 
of the United States sent congratulatory letters and showed up in 
person at major lesbian and gay events.435 
These things, together with same-sex marriage, were affirming. 
Beyond the benefits and the status, it appears that affirmation will be the most 
enduring impact of same-sex marriage.  Why?  Because affirmation furthers 
status as an individual, enhancing choice, opportunity, and exploration.  These 
elements are the facets of functional families, not the commitment explicitly and 
objectively required by marriage.  The benefits and protections provided by the 
state are valuable, but they come at a significant cost (individuality), and hence 
they are expensive to obtain.  Statistics illustrate both the rejection of form 
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marriage and that those least able to afford marriage are the ones more likely to 
reject it. 
Between 1867 and 1967, the annual marriage rate changed little . . . 
[but] [b]y 2000, the marriage rate had declined. . . . The rate continued 
to spiral downward, reaching an historic low . . . in 2009.  From 2009 
to 2012, the latest years for which marriage-rate statistics are 
available, the marriage rate stabilized at that historically low 
rate. . . .”436 
Phrased another way, “[i]n 1960, 72% of all adults age 18 and older were 
married,” but by 2010, that number was only 51%.437  While marriage rates have 
fallen, the number of nonmarital cohabitants rose to “7.7 million in 2010 and 
grew 41% between 2000 and 2010.”438  Between 2000 and 2010, the number of 
“opposite-sex unmarried partner households rose by 40.2%,” representing 5.9% 
of all households.439  Likewise, during the same time span, “the number of 
“same-sex partner households rose by 51.8%,” comprising 11.6% of all 
unmarried-partner households.440 
The percentage of unmarried persons cohabiting is highest among persons 
who are between the ages of 20 and 29, with lower rates for those who are in 
middle age and older.441  Further, “[a]n unfortunate feature of some cohabiting 
couples is that they are at or below the poverty level,”442 and they are also “less 
educated, disproportionately nonwhite, and more likely to have children from 
multiple partners.”443  Among same-sex couples, those “with relatively low 
levels of educational attainment are more likely to be raising children than 
couples with college or graduate degrees; same-sex couples that include racial 
minorities are also more likely to be raising children than white couples.”444   
“Specifically, forty-three percent of same-sex couples with less than a high 
school education are raising children together . . . same-sex couples raising 
children have substantially lower incomes on average than same-sex couples in 
general.”445 
The statistics indicate that the very couples who would benefit most from the 
economic benefits offered by marriage are those less likely to take advantage of 
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the newly established opportunity to marry.  The reality of these statistics, 
together with the individualistic attitude of those younger adults who, although 
better educated and more affluent, are cohabiting in rising numbers, further 
suggest that marriage equality will have little impact.  To meet the reality of this 
situation, a few commentators have written in support of greater recognition for 
nonmarital families.446  In other words, for state and federal governments to 
expand benefits beyond marriage they should encompass persons in functional 
family cohabitation.  Their suggestion is that alternative status arrangements 
other than marriage should be adopted by governments, but provide similar 
benefits.  These alternative status arrangements would create objective criteria, 
similar in fashion to what is currently used to create parental status for de facto 
parents.  This option, increased recognition for a kaleidoscope of family 
structures, seems more likely to be effective in creating benefits and parenthood 
among unmarried couples than the effect same-sex marriage will have on 
functional families other than affirmation for gays and lesbians. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the midst of a cultural shift in the United States towards functional rather 
than form families, the Supreme Court has ruled that same-sex couples have a 
constitutional right to marry. Such a right would appear to offer a solution to the 
nonmarital couples with children, providing a marital presumption for that 
partner, heretofore, without a genetic or an adoptive connection to the child the 
couple is raising together.  Marriage would offer an objective criterion, which 
would eliminate the often lengthy and costly litigation that accompanies 
petitions for custody or visitation.  As this Article illustrates there are many 
scenarios where a nonmarital union dissolves, and the genetically unrelated 
partner wishes to continue to be a parent with the child, but the genetic or 
adoptive parent refuses.  The attractiveness of marriage seems substantial, the 
avoidance of costly litigation is paramount to all of the parties involved, but the 
option of marriage is illusory.  Reflection on the statistics concerning the 
continual rise of nonmarital cohabitation, even the financial and status benefits 
associated with marriage will not be sufficient to entice younger adults to return 
to marriage.  The culture of functionalism is too firmly embedded in many 
younger persons who are tech savvy and supported by the media message 
advocating individualism.  Additionally, poorer young adults, faced with caring 
for children from multiple relationships are preoccupied and just as influenced 
by the media message of individuality, thereby connecting with their more 
educated and more affluent neighbors. 
Same-sex marriage will have little impact on same-sex couples.  It is arguable 
that any advantage will arise because of the status affirmation the decision gives 
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to gay and lesbian persons, including same-sex couples.  But for the children of 
same-sex couples, the current litigious system of determining parentage through 
extraordinary circumstances, psychological parenthood, and de facto parenthood 
will continue unabated.  As desirable as it is to reduce dissension, litigation, 
delay, and cost when seeking to provide for the best interest of those children 
involved, same-sex marriage is not the answer likely to be chosen by couples.  
And because couples will not qualify under objective statutory criteria as 
parents—but nonetheless have arguable equitable claims to parenthood—
statutes delineating de facto parenthood will be of little avail when establishing 
parental status.  For increasing numbers, contentious litigation is the unintended 
consequence of functionalism, self-ordering, and independence.  Marriage is 
unattractive.  Sadly, when considering Obergefell’s impact on functional 
families, the conclusion must be that there will be very little impact at all. 
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